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Foreign aid is more likely to be effective in countries with quality institutions and low levels of 
corruption. Therefore, the OECD Development Assistance Group (DAC) made it their official 
goal to be more selective in their aid allocation, based on recipients’ needs and institutional 
quality. On the other hand, aid donors that are not members of DAC have been criticised for 
not exhibiting the same level of selectivity that DAC donors claim to work towards. Using the 
statistical programme Stata/SE 16.0, I evaluate whether DAC donors meet their selectivity 
criteria with regards to corruption, and if donors’ self-interest distort aid allocations of DAC 
and non-DAC donors differently. In a twofold analysis, I apply the empirical strategies of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and pseudo poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) in order to 
determine whether corrupt countries receive more or less foreign aid, and how donors differ in 
their aid allocation. I find that more foreign aid is allocated to more corrupt countries overall. 
However, donors allocate their aid highly heterogeneously, even within groups that should 
follow the same allocation rules. There are donors both within and outside of DAC that gives 
more aid to more corrupt countries. Most donors are concerned with self-interest to some extent, 
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1.   Introduction 
Poverty and inequality is one of the biggest problems the world is dealing with today. In 2017, 
the global extreme poverty rate was 9.2 percent, which amounts to 689 million people living 
on less than 1.90 dollars a day. 43.6 percent of the world's population lived on less than 5.50 
dollars a day. Global poverty has been decreasing the last 25 years, but due to Covid-19 the 
poverty rate is expected to increase. Climate change and its consequences is also a big threat 
for poor countries (The World Bank, 2020a). In addition to influencing the health, education 
and well-being of individuals, poverty aggravates other global issues such as conflict, terrorism, 
disease and climate change.  
 
While poverty is a major problem in the world today, there are large differences in poverty 
between countries. Two thirds of global inequality is the result of differences in average 
incomes between countries (The World Bank, 2019). In 2016, the top 1 percent of income-
receiving adults accounted for 20 percent of the world's total income pre-tax (World Inequality 
Database, 2016). The average national income per adult was 1000€ in 2019, while it was 55 
000€ in Norway (World Inequality Database, 2019). 
 
Foreign aid could be an important tool in trying to reduce global poverty and even out 
inequalities between countries. However, the literature about foreign aid disagrees about 
whether it is actually effective. There are three different viewpoints. Early research claim that 
aid overall has a positive impact on development and economic growth (Dowling Jr & 
Hiemenz, 1983; Levy, 1988; Papanek, 1973). Others point out that foreign aid could lead to 
corruption and wasted resources, as well as discourage saving and necessary reform. Therefore, 
aid could have no or a negative impact on growth (Bauer, 1976; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004). 
Going off of the reasoning that aid can be destructive, the third viewpoint claims that aid can 
be effective if there are good policies and institutions in the recipient country (Boone, 1996; 
Burnside & Dollar, 2000).  
 
The last viewpoint has gained a lot of traction in the aid community, and have lead many donors 
to reconsider their aid practices. If aid is only effective where quality institutions are present, 
aid donors should encourage institutional change and give aid to less corrupt countries with 
good governance (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004). For donors organised through the OECD 
Development Assistance Group (DAC), this line of thought has led to the Paris Declaration and 
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the Accra Agenda for Action (Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 2005, 2008). Here 
the donors commit to a set of principles that should ensure effective aid, through conditions and 
selective aid allocation (Easterly & Williamson, 2011). Particularly, it is stated that:  
 
“We commit ourselves to taking concrete and effective action to address the remaining 
challenges, including: (…) Corruption and lack of transparency, which erode public support, 
impede effective resource mobilisation and allocation and divert resources away from activities 
that are vital for poverty reduction and sustainable economic development. Where corruption 
exists, it inhibits donors from relying on partner country systems.”(OECD, 2005) 
 
In later years, however, donors that are not members of DAC have become more prominent on 
the aid scene. These countries are often referred to as "new" donors in the literature, and do not 
have the same principles of conditionality and selectivity as DAC donors. Many of these 
countries are previous developing countries, and argue that this gives them experience to better 
target their aid. However, critics claim that new donors act on the basis of self-interest, and 
undermine the efforts of DAC-countries to combat corruption and undemocratic regimes 
(Dreher, 2019).  
 
There has been some research on the aid allocation of both DAC and non-DAC donors, but the 
results are inconclusive so far. The majority of the literature uses older data, and focuses mainly 
on DAC donors. In this masters’ thesis, I therefore use more recent data for both DAC and non-
DAC donors in order to answer the research question:  
 
“Are donors successful in selectively allocating aid based on criteria of need and quality 
institutions, and are claims that non-DAC donors undermine DAC donors’ efforts justified?”  
 
In order to answer this research question, I perform an empirical analysis of corruption on aid 
allocation, where I control for recipients’ need and donors’ self-interest which can distort their 
allocation decision. The rest of the thesis will be structured as follows: Section 2 goes through 
some definitions and background information about corruption and conditionality. In Section 3 
I explain relevant theories of aid allocation, and Section 4 reviews literature on the subject 
matter. Section 5 describes the data that will be used, and the empirical strategy is accounted 
for in Section 6. The results of the empirical analysis are reported in Section 7, and then 




2.1. Corruption  
Corruption is not a clear concept, and many researchers have tried to find the best suitable 
definition, leading to many different definitions of the term. Transparency International  n.d.) 
defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Corruption is a problem 
that harms society greatly, although its consequences are sometimes difficult to measure. When 
corruption is present in a society, it can weaken trust and democracy, interfere with economic 
development, and intensify poverty and inequality.  
From an economic viewpoint, corruption can be defined as “A trade in decisions that should 
not be for sale” (Søreide, 2016). For a corrupt transaction to take place, there needs to be an 
individual that controls something with value and has discretionary power. Both parties need to 
weigh the monetary or non-monetary gain from the corrupt act against the risk of punishment 
and moral costs (Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Søreide, 2016).  
Because foreign aid is a large inflow of resources, which some officials in the recipient country 
is responsible for, it facilitates rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. In addition, corruption 
can negatively affect the same issues that aid is attempting to alleviate. If aid actually increases 
corruption, the consequences could be devastating. In conjunction with the anti-corruption 
campaign in the 1990's, DAC started discussing and developing strategies for reducing 
corruption in foreign aid. At this point, some research into this relationship had been done, but 
no conclusive results had been made. The subject gained increased attention in the late 90s and 
early 2000s, both empirically and in aid policies.  
2.2. Conditions of Foreign Aid  
Conditionality of foreign aid can be implemented both in the positive sense (reward for good 
behaviour) or negative sense (threaten to- or actually terminate, suspend or reduce aid flows). 
Conditions can be implemented on different levels, such as the national level, sectorial level or 
project level. Conditions regarding democracy and good governance is most often applied to 
the national level (Selbervik, 1997). While some donors use conditionality of foreign aid 
actively, others claim not to set conditions at all. In the following section, I will sort donors into 
groups based on their aid policies. The clearest distinction is that between donors who are 
members of the OECD DAC, and those who are not. Within these groups, one can differentiate 
between several sub-groups, as described below.  
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2.2.1. DAC Donors  
Developed countries have been giving aid since colonial times, both bilateral and through 
multinational organisations. In 1960, the most prominent aid donors organized in what is now 
known as the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (OECD, 2006). Today there 
are 30 DAC members, and these are considered the "traditional donors", working within a 
specific framework for aid-giving. Donors that are members of DAC follow several principles 
that are supposed to govern their aid. These principles are summed up in the 2005 Paris 
Declaration, and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. One of the guiding principles in these 
agreements is that recipients of aid have to commit to "make progress towards building 
institutions and establishing governance structures that deliver effective governance, public 
safety, security, and equitable access to basic social services for their citizens" (Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), 2005, 2008). More generally, DAC countries provide aid with 
conditions of human rights protection, promotion of democracy, and reduction of corruption 
(Apodaca, 2017).  
 
Although DAC countries operate by the same principles, there still appear to be differences in 
how these countries choose to allocate their aid. For example, Alesina and Weder (2002) found 
that Scandinavian countries and Australia tend to donate more to less corrupt countries. This 
illustrates that there might be some differentiation in conditions of aid even among DAC 
donors. In order to account for such differences, I will use evidence provided in Lundsgaarde 
(2012) and Neumayer (2003a) to sort DAC donors into two categories: Strong conditions for 
foreign aid and weaker conditions for foreign aid. Lundsgaarde (2012) points to the welfare 
state and egalitarian values as possible explanations for why Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands donate a large proportion of GNI to foreign aid compared to other countries. 
Neumayer (2003a) claims that Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Sweden put 
more emphasis on good governance in aid recipients than other DAC countries. In order to 
simplify the distinction, I will therefore differentiate between Nordic donors and other DAC 
donors. 
2.2.2. Non-DAC Donors 
A commonality for most Non-DAC donors is that they provide aid without the conditions of 
human rights and good governance that DAC countries set (Apodaca, 2017). Although aid from 
non-DAC countries is commonly referred to as "non-conditional", this is not necessarily the 
case. Non-DAC countries have their own aid programmes, with their own conditions. These 
donors are not a unified group, and it therefore makes sense to break them further down into 
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smaller groups based on the conditions and characteristics of the aid they provide. The 
categorisation below is based on Apodaca (2017).  
i) Middle East and OPEC countries 
Middle Eastern and OPEC countries form a quite homogeneous group of foreign aid donors. In 
my data, this group consist of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They 
provide almost exclusively untied aid (Manning, 2006). Previously, these countries have mainly 
provided aid to Muslim countries, in an attempt to promote Islam and build solidarity between 
Arab countries. In later years, however, Middle Eastern countries have started to broaden their 
horizon in terms of aid recipients, especially to countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although this group of non-DAC donors do not place conditions of human rights or quality 
institutions, they try to prevent corruption in their foreign aid projects (Apodaca, 2017).  
ii) EU countries that are not members of DAC 
The next category of non-DAC aid donors are the countries that are members of the EU. The 
countries in my dataset that fits into this group are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These donors 
are likely to follow the direction of DAC pretty closely (Apodaca, 2017). Because Liechtenstein 
and Monaco cooperate closely with EU, and to some degree follow their principles for aid 
giving, I include them in this category even though they are not members of EU (Gouvernement 
Princier Principauté De Monaco, n.d.; Liechtenstein, n.d.).  
iii) Other Non-DAC countries 
The remaining group of non-DAC donors is quite diverse. It includes the South-American 
country Chile, the Asian countries India, China, Taiwan and Thailand, as well as South Africa. 
Thailand is showing interest in communicating and cooperating with DAC, and one can 
therefore expect that they will not stray too far away from DAC standards for aid. India and 
China are the most prominent of the donors in this group, and have gained the most attention.  
China still follows eight principles of foreign aid that was laid out by premier Zhou Enlai in 
1964 (Bräutigam, 2011). These entail that donor and recipient should be equal and both should 
benefit from the relationship. China should also maintain respect for the sovereignty in the 
recipient country, and therefore there should not be any conditions attached to the aid. This 
principle is the most relevant to my research question. The aid will be provided through interest-
free or low interest loans, and promote self-reliance in the recipient country. The results of 
Chinese aid should be quick, and Chinese experts are expected to live at the standard of local 
experts. In addition, Chinese aid emphasises technology transfer, and the recipient country 
6 
 
should use the best-quality equipment of Chinese manufacture. The last principle clearly entails 
that Chinese aid is tied, although China Eximbank states that "no less than 50% of total 
procurement shall be made in China" (Bräutigam, 2011). This is another point where China 
clearly differs from DAC countries, as they strive to provide non-tied aid.  
India's foreign aid policy can be summed up in three simple principles (Price, 2005): They give 
aid for economic and political reasons, and in an attempt to improve relations. India believes 
that the wrong type of aid can be counter-productive, and that conditional or tied aid can be 
degrading for the recipient country. This indicates that aid from India is openly reciprocal and 
has an element of self-interest. However, India differentiates from China by avoiding tied aid. 
3. Theories of Aid Allocation 
3.1. Motivations of Aid 
Although aid donations are often justified publicly as intended to help countries, there are 
several possible motivations for giving aid. These can be sorted into three categories: altruistic 
motivations, political motivations and economic motivations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Perhaps the most obvious altruistic motivation is poverty reduction. However, literature has 
shown that in order for foreign aid to successfully alleviate poverty, the recipient country needs 
to have good economic policies and institutions in place (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Therefore, 
improving institutions and reducing corruption is also an altruistic motivation for aid donation, 
both in itself and in order to increase aid effectiveness. The same goes for rewarding good 
economic policies.  
In line with the objective of improving institutions, many aid donors view encouraging 
democracy as a motivation for aid. While the idea that democratic institutions are more efficient 
and beneficial for the population is widespread in western countries, supporting democracies 
can also be viewed as an ideological motivation. This is evidenced by the fact that democracy 
became a larger focus of Western aid donors after the breakup of the Soviet Union (Perkins et 
al., 2013). In the same way, donors with other ideological stances, such as socialism, might be 
more inclined to support recipients with common ideologies . Such motivations are often driven 
by a genuine belief in their own ideology, as well as a way to form alliances and cooperation.  
Another political motivation closely related to this is foreign policy. Donors are shown to be 
more inclined to give aid to countries that agree with them on matters of international policy 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2000). This could either be due to a sense of common goals and views, but 
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could also serve as a way to encourage possible aid recipients to agree with donor countries in 
such matters. Previous colonists are inclined to donate more aid to their former colonies. Again, 
this could either be motivated by a sense of common history, a way to compensate for previous 
wrongdoings, or an attempt to keep their influence over the former colonies. Donors are also 
known to allocate aid to areas that are of specific interest for them. This is especially true for 
the United States, which gave large amounts of aid to Israel and Egypt in the 1980s (Perkins et 
al., 2013).  
Donors of foreign aid are also motivated to donate more to smaller countries. From a political 
stance, this could be due to a wish to influence as many countries as possible. Giving aid to 
many small countries is therefore more effective. In addition, many donors give aid in order to 
be viewed as altruistic and benevolent. Therefore, they prefer to give aid to smaller countries, 
as the aid flows appear larger on a per capita basis, in addition to having a larger effect on 
countries with smaller populations and economies (Perkins et al., 2013). 
When it comes to economic motivations for aid, commercial ties are important for many donors. 
Giving aid can improve trade relations, and specifically targeted aid can support industries that 
export to or import from the donor country. Tied aid is perhaps the most obvious form of 
commercially motivated aid, as it requires recipients to purchase resources from the donor 
country, such as machinery, equipment and services (Perkins et al., 2013). Although tied aid 
has been shown to be less effective, it is still in use due to the benefits to the donors. Economic 
motivations can also be more financial, specifically related to indebted recipients. Donors can 
feel obliged to provide aid and debt relief to heavily indebted countries in order to prevent them 
from falling behind. This is called “defensive lending” (Berthélemy, 2006).  
3.2. Samaritan’s Dilemma 
Assuming that the aid donor is altruistic, it wants to give aid to recipients in need with good 
institutions and governance, as discussed in Section 3.1. This creates a principal-agent problem, 
as the donor (agent) wants to encourage an effort to improve institutions in the recipient 
(principal), but the effort level is not always easily observed, and the recipient could have other 
incentives. For example, recipient governments often value short-run benefits of  corruption 
over the long-run benefits of quality institutions and effective aid (Knack & Rahman, 2007). In 
fact, there are several principal-agent relationships in aid, for example between tax-payers and 
donor government, or between government officials and citizens of the recipient country 
(Radelet, 2006). However, this thesis focuses on a macroeconomic and bilateral perspective, 
and the discussion will therefore be concentrated around donor and recipient governments. This 
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principal-agent problem leads to the Samaritan’s dilemma, a game theory of charity where 
helping reduces the incentives to perform better, first presented by Buchanan (1975). The 
Samaritan can claim that they will stop the charity if better behaviour is not observed in the 
other player, but actually stopping donations will give disutility in the form of watching the 
other player suffer and not being able to help. The Samaritan wants to be altruistic, and the 
other player can exploit this if he is aware. In order to overcome this problem, the Samaritan 
must be willing to suffer short term utility reductions in order to achieve the desired result in 
the future. How the Samaritan then chooses to act is dependent on the elasticity of their 
intertemporal utility function.  
If the recipient trusts the Samaritan’s willingness to suffer disutility, this is sufficient to shift its 
behaviour so that the Samaritan does not actually need to suffer from utility loss. There are 
several ways for the Samaritan to gain credibility. They can delegate the charity decision to an 
agent who will not be hesitant to stop charity transactions if desired behaviour is not observed. 
They can also commit to a rule of charity behaviour in advance, so that the decision is not made 
on a case-by-case basis. Committing to a rule becomes even more important in the case where 
there are several poor players, as the other players will change their behaviour if one poor player 
is given charity in spite of undesired behaviour. In a setting where there are several Samaritans, 
an executive organisation can impose rules of charity behaviour on the Samaritans, in order to 
increase their credibility and remove the variability of case-by-case transactions. This also 
ensures that the Samaritans are competing over charity giving on similar grounds, and that they 
do not undermine each other’s efforts.                          
Going off of the theory of Samaritan’s dilemma, Svensson (2000) suggests that one reason for 
the poor macroeconomic performance of aid is a moral hazard problem which reduces 
recipients’ incentives to undertake structural reforms of institutions. In his principle agent 
model, he shows that once the recipient country has chosen their level of reform, donors have 
incentive to give more aid to recipients in need. Since the recipients are aware of this, they have 
incentives to commit to lower reform levels in the future in order to receive more aid. Svensson 
(2000) suggests that this problem can be solved in part by conditionality, but only if the donors 
can commit to an aid policy before the recipient country chooses their reform level, and stay 
true to this policy ex ante. If the reform effort is observable, donors can effectively give 
conditional aid in order to incentivise recipients to reform. When the reform effort is not 
completely observable, however, the second best alternative entails a compromise between 
inducing optimal reform incentives, and giving aid to those in most need. This is because donors 
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must award recipients with quality institutions and good governance with more aid in order to 
incentivise reform, and these recipients are often not the ones in most need (Easterly & 
Williamson, 2011; Gibson et al., 2005).    
3.3. Trade-Offs in Aid Motivations 
As described in the previous section, there exist a trade-off between enforcing conditionality 
and giving aid to the recipients that need it most. This is an intertemporal choice problem, 
because short-run benefits of giving aid to the poorest are weighed against long-term benefits 
of bettering institutions and increasing effectivity of aid (Svensson, 2000). This trade-off will 
exist even if donors are not purely altruistic, and possibly to a larger degree if not, as their gain 
from giving aid is larger, making them less willing to stop aid flows. In addition to this 
conditionality trade-off, there are also trade-offs between altruistic and self-interested 
motivations of aid. Earlier theories state that recipients’ needs and the self-interest of donors 
are mutually exclusive, so that self-interested donors cannot effectively provide needs-based 
aid with a positive impact on institutions. More recent theories, however, suggest that both can 
coexist, but that the existence of one implies a reduction of the other (Clist, 2011). The trade-
off between self-interest and recipient’s needs can also be viewed as an intertemporal choice 
problem. Even self-interested donors would benefit from good institutions and development in 
recipient countries, as this increases benefits for the donor (Manning, 2006).                                                                                   
3.4. Donor Competition  
Due to the possible benefits of aid for the donors, it is likely that there exists some degree of 
competition between donors in the aid market. This was apparent during the cold war, when the 
United States and Soviet used aid donation as a means to influence countries ideologically. The 
Soviet Union gave aid to countries with communist ideologies, such as North Korea, Cuba and 
several countries in Eastern Europe. The United States attempted to support liberal governments 
in countries with ideological conflicts, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (then Zaire), and several Central American countries. Both countries 
also used aid in order to influence newly independent countries in Africa. France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Taiwan and China have also used aid in a competitive way (Perkins et al., 
2013; Radelet, 2006).  
Competition between potential donors can create incentive problems. If the recipient country 
knows that there are several potential donors willing to provide aid, conditionality cannot be 
achieved by threatening to withdraw aid if the conditions are not met. This is especially a 
problem if there is large heterogeneity in donors and the conditions they set (Gibson, Andersson 
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et al. 2005). Recipient countries could prefer to receive aid from donors with fewer conditions 
(Hernandez, 2017; Woods, 2008).  
Because donors cannot effectively threaten to withdraw from a country that does not meet their 
conditions, they can end up being less selective in their allocation. In addition, if one donor 
increases their aid to a recipient country, more of the impact of the total aid to this country is 
credited to this donor. If donors maximise their own aid impact relative to that of other donors’, 
thereby reflecting competition, the Nash equilibrium for each donor entails donating to all 
possible recipients. (Annen & Moers, 2017). There exists a trade-off between donating to as 
many countries as possible and selectivity in aid, as these are opposites and cannot be achieved 
at the same time.  
This theory predicts that large donors will fragment their aid between all recipients, because 
their budget is large enough to do so. Smaller donors, however, have to concentrate their efforts, 
and therefore give aid to the recipients who receive less than the efficient amount of aid from 
the large donors. However, if the fixed costs of donating are large enough, it becomes more 
effective for small donors to coordinate their efforts, splitting the countries that receive too little 
from the large donors between them. The theory therefore predicts that since smaller donors are 
not in a position to compete, they focus more on maximising their own aid impact than their 
impact relative to other donors. This leads to smaller donors coordinating their efforts to 
improve efficiency, while larger donors continue to donate to many recipients (Annen & Moers, 
2017).  
Donors who compete in export markets may be more likely to allocate more aid to the recipients 
of aid from their competitor (Barthel et al., 2014). This is because they compete for economic 
influence, and risk losing this competition if they are not present in countries that receive aid 
from the competitor. The economic incentives to win this aid competition can either be directly 
through tied aid, or indirectly through “goodwill” and creating a relationship that could induce 
trade benefits. According to this theory, donors that compete in exports will have similar 
allocation patterns, because their aid decisions influence each other. This logic can also be 
extended to other fields of competition, for example political competition.  
In addition to the principle-agent problems with conditionality when there is competition 
between donors, several other problems can occur when many donors operate in the same 
recipient country. In such a situation, each individual donor do not have a large impact on 
development, and therefore the responsibility of aid success becomes dispersed. This creates a 
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collective action problem. As explained in Section 3.1, all donors have their own aid 
motivations, sometimes conflicting with development goals. The more donors are present in a 
recipient country, the higher incentives to prioritize these motivations over development 
(Knack & Rahman, 2007).  
3.5. Implications of Theory for Aid Allocation and Corruption 
The theory of Samaritan’s dilemma shows that conditional aid does not work unless the donor 
credibly states that they will end aid transactions if governance is not improved. If conditional 
aid does not work, and aid in fact incentivises poor development, one could argue that aid 
should not be given at all. As mentioned, a way to improve effectiveness of conditionality is to 
commit to an allocation rule in advance. In order to be credible, the allocation rule needs to be 
enforced, so the donors must be selective in their aid allocation. DAC donors have committed 
to allocation rules through the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action 
(2008), as described in Section 2.2.1. This is also a way for donors to allocate aid according to 
a rule set by an executive organisation. In addition to increasing the credibility of conditionality, 
this also ensures that the donors do not undermine each other’s efforts by operating with 
different rules. Based on this, one would expect to see selectivity exhibited in the aid allocation 
of DAC donors, giving more aid to less corrupt countries. One would also expect that DAC 
donors allocate aid similarly.  
Another option is to allocate the aid decision to an agent, such as the World Bank or the IMF, 
which will enforce their allocation rule more strictly. This is done to a certain degree, and these 
institutions are viewed as stricter enforcers of conditionality than bilateral donors (Dreher, 
2019; Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018). Even though it would be more effective if all aid was 
allocated though such institutions, that is not the case in the aid market. This can probably be 
accredited partly to donors’ self-interest, as they would not gain any benefits of aid delivered 
through an agent (Ehrenfeld, 2004).  
Applying the theory of aid motivations to aid allocation, one would expect that altruistic donors 
give more aid to recipients with good institutions, both because this is a goal in itself and 
because it increases effectiveness of aid. As explained in Section 3.2 and 3.3, however, there 
could be a trade-off between giving aid to the recipients that need it most and those who have 
exhibited good governance. If this is the case we would expect it to be apparent in aid allocation, 
so that donors prioritise either the recipient’s need or the quality of its institution. The self-
interest of donors is also likely to be reflected in allocation (Perkins et al., 2013). Since there is 
a trade-off between altruistic and self-interest motivations for aid, it is likely that more self-
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interested donors do not consider recipients’ needs or governance in their allocation. Non-DAC 
donors have been accused of being too concerned with political and economic self-interest 
(Naim, 2007; Woods, 2008). If this is true, non-DAC donors are more likely to donate to 
countries in which they have interests, and thereby overlooking concerns for good governance 
and poverty reduction. However, this allocation pattern is also to be expected from other self-
interested donors.  
The theory of competition in aid suggests that competition between heterogenous donors will 
lead to sub-optimal results. Donors risk being replaced if they demand that their conditions are 
met. This theory is in line with the common argument against non-DAC aid that aid from these 
sources undermine conditions set by DAC donors (Dreher et al., 2011; Dreher, 2019). In fact, 
Hernandez (2017) found that some non-traditional donors undermine World Bank 
conditionality. Most notably, he found that the World Bank give loans with fewer conditions 
attached to countries in which China is present, indicating that they cut back on their conditions 
in order to remain competitive in the loan-giving market. Since DAC have set a goal of 
increased aid cooperation, it is less likely that conditionality is challenged when there are many 
potential DAC donors. This is enhanced by the fact that these donors officially operate by many 
of the same rules. As proof of this difference between DAC and non-DAC donors, Hernandez 
(2017) found that the presence of DAC donors did not threaten World Bank conditionality. 
Applied to the aid allocation of DAC and non-DAC donors, this theory could point in several 
directions. If DAC donors are following their own conditionality regime strictly, they could get 
pushed out of countries in which incentive problems are strong, leading them to donate to 
countries with better institutions. On the other hand, DAC donors could be tempted to reduce 
their conditions in order to remain competitive, and be less selective in their allocation.  
If the theory that competition between donors make it effective to give aid to many recipients 
(Annen & Moers, 2017) holds, aid allocation of DAC donors is likely to be influenced by the 
growth of non-DAC donors, as these are strong competitors. With increased competition, large 
donors are likely to react with fragmenting their aid among many recipients, reducing 
selectivity. Smaller donors, however, would concentrate their aid efforts, making it easier for 
them to be selective in their allocation. This theory predicts that large DAC donors are less 
selective in their aid allocation than smaller DAC donors. However, the only thing that separates 
these groups of donors are their aid budgets. Therefore, selective donors would provide aid to 
more recipients if they had larger aid budgets.  
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If competing donors follow similar allocation patterns, as claimed by Barthel et al. (2014), this 
could impact the aid allocation of both DAC and non-DAC donors. They point out that several 
non-DAC donors, such as China, are strongly exports oriented, and that they therefore may 
allocate aid similarly to large DAC donors with exports interests. However, it is also possible 
for DAC donors to be influenced by non-DAC donors, given the competition they pose. This 
could be especially likely if recipients prefer to receive unconditional aid (Hernandez, 2017; 
Woods, 2008), giving non-DAC donors a competitive advantage. This could be the case if 
recipient governments value short-term benefits of rent-seeking over long-term benefits of 
quality institutions (Knack & Rahman, 2007).  
4. Empirical Literature 
4.1. Patterns of Aid Allocation 
There is no significant evidence that donors allocate more aid to countries with less corruption, 
Svensson (1999) finds in preliminary estimations. The basis for this result is aid data from 1980 
to 1993. The result is supported by Alesina and Weder (2002), who do not find evidence that 
less corrupt countries receive more foreign aid or debt relief in the period 1975-1995. This is 
somewhat surprising, as bilateral and multilateral aid programs often aim to reward quality 
institutions and efficient governments. Both papers study only DAC donors. These findings 
suggest that donors do not follow the conditions they set in their aid regimes.  
However, the previous findings could be driven either by the time period or which donors are 
included in the data. When comparing aid allocation in the 1980s and 1990s, Berthélemy and 
Tichit (2004) find that aid was more dependent on politics and history in the former period, 
while the focus shifted in the 1990s to care more about economic self-interest. Alesina and 
Weder (2002) also find some indication that political interests may have lost some importance 
in the 1990s compared to previous periods. However, Berthélemy (2006) finds a significant 
reduction in the impact of the trade variable from the 1980s to the 1990s. The reason mentioned 
is that donors try not to give aid for commercial reasons as they strive to provide less tied aid. 
There could be other time trends in aid allocation, and it would be interesting to see if allocation 
follows a similar pattern in more recent years.  
Again studying only DAC donors, Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) find that donors reward good 
economic policies since 1990, and pays attention to democracy when allocating aid. Donors 
donate more to small, democratic countries, with a high flow of FDI and economic growth. 
Donors appear to be more concerned with non-monetary dimensions of poverty, such as infant 
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mortality, than with income. Using a two-stage model to split up the aid decision, (Berthélemy, 
2006) finds that selected countries receive more aid if they have high imports from the donor 
country, if they have geopolitical or colonial ties with the donor country, if they are poor, 
democratic and not involved in interstate conflicts. A potential recipient has a higher probability 
of receiving aid if it is poorer, trades more with the donor, is more indebted, more democratic 
and has a higher population. 
Despite these possible time effects in aid allocation, Clist (2011) does not find that policy 
selectivity is increasing. Rather, he finds that few of the seven largest DAC donors he analyses 
rewards less corrupt countries, and that this result is mainly static over time. He criticises the 
method used in Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), claiming their results could be misleading due 
to collinearity, and that lagged economic growth is a problematic variable for capturing 
economic policies. Claiming that donors have not exhibited policy selectivity over the last 25 
years (1982-2006), Clist (2011) argues that one cannot say with certainty whether selectivity 
increases aid effectivity. Similarly to this article, Easterly and Williamson (2011) find that DAC 
donors give aid to more corrupt countries, and that the share of aid to corrupt countries actually 
increased from 1996 to 2002. They find that this to a large degree is not because donors are 
selecting more corrupt countries, but rather that they give aid to the same recipients over time, 
and these have become more corrupt. The poor selectivity in corruption is not explained by 
donors prioritising recipients’ needs (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). Due to this poor performance 
of selectivity, Easterly and Williamson (2011) call for DAC donors to follow the allocation 
rules they have created for themselves.  
Trying to explain the ambiguous results in aid literature, Brück and Xu (2012) apply an event 
study approach to investigate if shocks and changes in the recipient country leads to sudden aid 
accelerations. They find that positive regime changes, declarations of independence and 
international conflicts are associated with aid accelerations. When applying the standard 
method of averaging, however, they find that the results tend to differ from those of the event 
study, and that they are fragile to changes in averaging periods. This could be explained by 
interpreting the results as short-term and long-term effects, but Brück and Xu (2012) stand by 
their argument that averaging masks important volatility effects.  
4.2. Heterogeneity in Donor Behaviour 
When investigating the allocation of donors individually, economists find that there are large 
differences in donor behaviour. Alesina and Weder (2002) find some variations in how donors 
allocate aid. Scandinavian countries and Australia tend to give more aid to less corrupt 
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countries. Supporting this, Clist (2011) finds that Sweden rewards less corrupt recipients in 
recent years. The United States, on the other hand, gives more aid to more corrupt countries 
(Alesina & Weder, 2002). Still, the United States gives more to democracies than dictatorships. 
This is in line with Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), who find that the United States and Australia 
value democracy significantly more than other donors. France and Belgium donate significantly 
more to non-democratic countries, this paper finds in some specifications. The U.S. do not seem 
to allocate aid based on economic performance indicators, caring only about democracy. It is 
suggested that this could be because they give aid to post conflict countries that are growing 
more democratic, but with fewer investment opportunities and slower economic growth.  
Also finding heterogeneity in donor behaviour, Berthélemy (2006) sorts donors into clusters 
based on how much they consider trade intensity in their aid allocation. Austria, Denmark, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland are considered altruistic donors since they 
care less about trade intensity, while Australia, France and Italy are described as egoistic donors 
in this regard. Surprisingly, both Austria and New Zealand are found to give more aid to their 
trading partners, according to Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) using similar data but different 
estimation strategy. However, he also finds this result for Australia, similarly to Berthélemy 
(2006). Although Alesina and Weder (2002) use a different variable for trade, they find that the 
United States, France and the United Kingdom, which are described as moderately egoistic by 
Berthélemy (2006), give more aid to more economically open countries. This is also the case 
for Australia, which falls into the egoistic cluster. Alesina and Weder (2002) view this 
parameter as a sign that donors reward good economic policies, but when comparing the two 
papers it might seem like this allocation behaviour comes from self-interest motives. It is also 
possible that the opposite is true, namely that the results in Berthélemy (2006) and Berthélemy 
and Tichit (2004) simply reflect that these donors reward economically open countries. The 
way donors are sorted as more or less altruistic based on their trade interest in the former could 
be problematic, as some donors pursue multiple goals in their aid allocation (Clist, 2011).  
Colonial ties are important in the aid allocation of previous colonists. France, the United 
Kingdom, Portugal and Spain donate significantly more aid to their previous colonies, 
according to Berthélemy and Tichit (2004). This supports the findings in Alesina and Weder 
(2002) that more aid is allocated to the former colonies of France, Portugal, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. Both papers centre their analysis around the 1980s and 1990s, indicating that colonial 
ties were clearly an important determinant of aid in this period. However, they focus only on 
aid from previous colonists to their colonies. It is therefore difficult to say if all former colonies 
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receive more aid because they have poor institutions, or if the observed pattern is actually due 
to the specific ties between a colonist and their former colony.  
There is a coordination problem in foreign aid, Brück and Xu (2012) find when doing an event 
study on the 10 largest DAC donors separately. The donors seem to operate with different 
allocation rules, undermining each other’s aid efforts. For example, they find a significantly 
positive spill-over effect of internal conflict for Norway and the U.S., while this effect is 
significantly negative for Sweden. The effect of economic reforms is positive for Spain but 
negative for Japan. The results for all donors collectively are often insignificant because the 
effects for individual donors go in opposite directions. Despite efforts to coordinate, Clist 
(2011) credits heterogeneity in allocation to different priorities in donors’ aid regimes. These 
results beg the question if there are differences in donors’ motivations for giving aid, and if the 
differences are as prevalent in more recent years.  
4.3. Aid Allocation of non-DAC donors 
Non-traditional aid has received increased attention in later years. Critics argue that other 
countries than the DAC members undermine development efforts by providing aid from non-
democratic sources, without conditions and without transparency. They point to a problem with 
these new donors pricing DAC donors and multilateral donors out of the market, so that their 
efforts of bettering institutions in the receiving country through aid conditions is compromised. 
In addition, the hardest critics claim that new donors do not have any intention of actually 
helping the countries that are aided. Rather, they are concerned with their own political, 
ideological and economic interest. Aid projects from China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela 
are used as examples of these issues (Naim, 2007). A more nuanced view is that non-DAC 
donors are not intentionally trying to replace DAC donors or overrun conditionality, but rather 
that they provide alternative financing for countries in need. This increases competition in the 
aid marked and lowers the bargaining power of DAC donors in respect to recipients. According 
to this view, emerging donors pose a challenge for standard-setting in the aid community 
(Woods, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, supporters of non-traditional aid argue that donors that have previously been 
aid receivers themselves, are more likely to give better targeted aid. They are in possession of 
knowledge and understanding that can be helpful to the receiving countries, and receiving 
countries might be more inclined to take advice from donors that have been in the same position 
previously (Dreher et al., 2011; Woods, 2008). 
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When comparing the allocation of aid by DAC and non-DAC countries, Dreher et al. (2011) 
find that new donors pay less attention to where aid is needed and donates more to close 
neighbours. However, they are not concerned with commercial self-interest, and they show a 
weaker bias towards poorly governed countries than traditional donors. Still, there is a lot of 
heterogeneity in the aid allocation of “new” donors, similarly to what has previously been found 
for traditional donors. Specifically, the United Arab Emirates and Colombia rewards less 
corrupt countries, while Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Saudi Arabia and South 
Africa gives more aid to more corrupt countries. There is also some indication of a trade-off 
between selectivity of corruption and recipients’ needs, as both considerations do not appear at 
the same time for any of the donors. The period analysed is 2001 to 2008. These results do not 
entirely support the views of either critics of the new donors or of optimists, but shows that the 
picture is more complex. It is yet to be seen whether these results apply to a wider selection of 
new donors, as this study lacks data for India and China.  
 
Arab countries are more likely to give aid to Islamic Arab and Sub-Saharan African countries 
in need, that agree with them on international politics and do not side with Israel in the Israel-
Palestine conflict (Neumayer, 2003b). However, once the recipients are chosen, more aid is not 
allocated to the countries that need it most. This finding is based on the aid allocation of Arab 
donors from 1974 to 1997, and is in line with the common view of Arab aid practices (Apodaca, 
2017). Even though Arab donors appear to be somewhat altruistic in their consideration of 
recipients’ needs, it is also apparent that they are politically self-interested. Unfortunately, 
Neumayer (2003b) do not control for corruption in his analysis, and to the best of my knowledge 
there are no empirical studies of how Arab countries consider corruption in their aid allocation. 
 
Chinese aid fosters local-level corruption, according to a study conducted by Isaksson and 
Kotsadam (2018). Since many factors may influence corruption at the national level, this paper 
uses local data in an attempt to avoid omitted variable bias. One could theorise that the increase 
in corruption in areas that receive foreign aid is simply a result of increased economic activity 
in the area. However, the researchers found no evidence of this being the case. Nevertheless, 
they found that aid project financed by the World Bank increased economic growth without 
influencing corruption. Further developing the literature on Chinese aid and corruption on the 
local level, Dreher (2019) find that more Chinese aid is allocated to the birth regions of political 
leaders, indicating that Chinese aid is prone to political capture. Moreover, they find evidence 
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that this is a result of competition in national elections. As a comparison, they find no indication 
that aid from The World Bank is allocated more heavily to political leaders' birth regions. 
Dreher request further research into a wider set of donors in order to determine what rules and 
procedures on the donor side that prevent resources from being politically captured.  
 
The importance of political interests is larger for India than for traditional donors, Fuchs and 
Vadlamannati (2013) find when elaborating on the literature on new aid by focusing on India 
as a donor. In addition, India provides larger amounts of aid to countries they have large exports 
to. However, India donates more to recipients that score better on the control-of-corruption 
index. Studying India's aid allocation is interesting, as they are still a lower middle-income 
country. Why would a country that is struggling with poverty within its own borders spend 
funds on bilateral aid? The findings of this research suggests that the decision may be partly or 
fully influenced by self-interest. Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2013) points out that it would be 
beneficial for further research to compare India to China in regard to the investigated variables. 
It would indeed also be beneficial to the literature to research other non-traditional aid donors 
to see if their aid allocation decision is also taken with regards to political and economic 
interests.   
5. Data  
5.1. AidData 
In order to answer my research question, I combine several data sets. The first data set I am 
using is AidData’s Core Research Release Version 3.1, which was released in 2016 (Tierney et 
al., 2011). This data set shows all known bilateral and multilateral development flows from the 
donor perspective. Using this data, I will have to assume that the countries accurately reports 
their aid flows. The data covers the years 1947 to 2013, and includes information from 96 
donors. The data set reports all forms of development flows, including Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF), Export Credits, and Equity Investments. The 
aid commitment is reported in constant 2011 dollar terms.  
Development flows from China is not included in this data set. Since China is one of the most 
prominent new donors, with most controversy surrounding their aid practices, it is important to 
include this country in the analysis. I will therefore use AidData’s Global Chinese Finance 
Official Dataset Version 1.0 in addition (Dreher et al., 2021). This data was released in 2017 
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and covers the years from 2000 to 2014. The dataset includes ODA-like flows, OOF-like flows 
and "Vague" flows. Since most aid from China is not actually ODA (Bräutigam, 2011), I 
include all development flows from both datasets in order to increase the sample size. In this 
dataset the aid commitment is reported in constant 2014 dollar terms. I therefore had to convert 
the commitment amounts to constant 2011 amounts.    
5.2. Corruption Data  
As an indicator of corruption I use Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. 
This index ranks countries based on how corrupt business executives and experts perceive the 
country to be. The indicator consists of answers from thirteen different surveys from reliable 
institutions. It is also one of the most used indicators of corruption, making it the well suited 
for comparisons. The data set consist of results from the years 1995 to 2019, and ranges from 
1 (very corrupt) to 100 (not corrupt). The methodology used to develop the CPI was changed 
in 2012, which could challenge comparisons before and after the change (Saisana & Saltelli, 
2012). 
In addition to CPI-score, I will use another indicators of corruption, namely The World Bank's 
Control of Corruption measure. This indicator measures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private good, as well as political capture by private interest. The 
data set covers the years 1996 to 2019, and ranges from -2.5 (very corrupt) to 2.5 (very clean).   
5.3. Control Variables 
In addition to these main data sets, I also use data from several other sources. As control 
variables, I will use GDP per capita, as several studies have found that aid is dependent on the 
recipient country's income (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Tavares, 2003). This is used as a measure 
of the recipient country’s poverty, and therefore their need, as discussed in Section 3. In 
addition, I will control for population, since aid is found in literature to rely negatively on the 
recipient’s population (Alesina & Weder, 2002) due to the advantages of giving aid to small 
countries. In addition I will control for colonial history, since former colonies may have poor 
institutions (Tavares, 2003). On the other hand, donors who are former colonists may give more 
aid to their colonies since they have a closer relationship (Alesina & Weder, 2002).  
The degree of economic openness of the recipient country will also be controlled for. This can 
be seen as a proxy for good economic policies (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Berthélemy & Tichit, 
2004), but it can also be viewed as trade willingness, and therefore reflect donors’ economic 
interests (Berthélemy, 2006).  
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Democracy is also included as a control variable, as it is another measure of political interest. 
Some researchers interpret democracy as an altruistic determinant of aid (Easterly & 
Williamson, 2011) but this view implies that democracy is necessary for growth and 
development. Previous literature finds that democracy influences aid allocation (Alesina & 
Weder, 2002), but that in what direction differs between donors (Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004).  
I also control for oil rents and mineral rents in my analysis, as self-interested donors might 
attempt to benefit from this. This line of thought is connected with the theory of a natural 
resource curse, which shows that extraction of natural resources generate revenues and captures 
the interest of foreign agents which creates opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour (Leite & 
Weidmann, 1999). 
To measure income, I use the real GDP measure from University of Groningen’s Penn World 
Table Version 9.1. This indicator measures the real GDP for 182 countries at constant 2011 
prices in US$ and covers the years 1970 to 2017. I will also use the population variable from 
the same data set.  
To measure the openness of the economies, I use Our World In Data's Trade Openness 
indicator, which measures the sum of a country's exports and imports as a share of GDP. This 
data set covers the years 1970 to 2017.  
To measure democracy, I will use two variables from Freedom House's Global Freedom Scores, 
namely Political rights and Civil liberties. These indicators rate individual freedoms like 
freedom of expression, the right to vote, and equality before the law. The data set covers 210 
countries from 1972 to 2019. The variables ranges from 1 (Free) to 7 (Not Free). I will also use 
another measure of democracy, namely the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability indicator. 
This index ranges from -2.5 (Not Free) to 2.5 (Free), and covers the years 1996 to 2019.  
As a measure of colonial history, I will use two variables from the Centre d'Études Prospectives 
et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) GeoDist data set, namely Colonizer (long period and 
subnational participation in governance) and Colonizer (short period or low involvement in 
governance). These variables indicate whether the country has been a colony and for how long. 
The data set covers 225 countries.  
For measuring rents from natural resources, I will use The World Bank's Oil Rents (% of GDP) 
data. This variable measures the difference between the value of crude oil production at world 
prices and total costs of production. The data set covers the years 1960 to 2020 for 264 
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countries. I will also use The World Bank’s (2011) Mineral Rents (% of GDP) indicator. This 
data measures the difference between the value of production for a stock of minerals at world 
prices and their total costs of production. The variable includes rent from extraction of tin, gold, 
lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate. The dataset has been updated 
annually from 1970 to 2018.  
As a measure of foreign direct investment, I will use The World Bank’s Foreign direct 
investment, net inflows (BoP, current US\$). The data set covers the years 1970 to 2019.  
Table 1: Description of Data Sources 
          
Variable      Description    Source 
 Aid per capita Bilateral aid flows (constant $2011) AidData, Core Research Release Version 3.1 and Global 
Chinese Finance Official Dataset Version 1.0 
     
 CPI-score Corruption Perceptions Index,  
1 (very corrupt) to 100 (not corrupt) 
Transparency International 
     
 Control of Corruption  Control of Corruption,  
-2.5 (very corrupt) to 2.5 (very clean) 
The World Bank,  
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
     
 Income  Real GDP per capita                Penn World Table Version 9.1 
                          Feenstra et al. (2015) 
     
 Population Population (in millions) Penn World Table Version 9.1 
   Feenstra et al. (2015) 
     
 Openness Trade Openness, sum of export and 
import as share of GDP 
Our World In Data 
     
 Democracy Political Rights, 0 (free) to 7 (not 
free)/ Voice and accountability, -2.5 
(not free) to 2.5 (free)  
Freedom House/ 
The World Bank, WGI 
     
 Long colony Recipient has been colonized for a 
long period with subnational 
participation in governance 
Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII), GeoDist 
     
 Short Colony Recipient has been colonized for a 
short period/ low involvement in 
governance 
Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII), GeoDist 
     
5.4. Data cleaning  
The data on aid commitment is aggregated over year and donor-recipient pair based on mean 
commitment amounts. Before aggregation, the data set consisted of about 1 million observation. 
Aggregating takes that number down to 73 553. There are 27 small countries and island states 
that do not have Correlates of War codes and will therefore need to be excluded from the 
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analysis1. In addition, observations in which the recipient country is not specified, such as 
regional aid programs, are dropped. After this, the data set has 66 325 observations. Since we 
only have CPI-scores starting from 1995, all previous years are dropped. In addition, missing 
years and years later than 2013 are dropped. This leaves 52 302 observations. Some countries 
are not evaluated by Transparency International. After dropping countries that do not have CPI-
scores there are 50 907 observations. In addition, there are many countries that have missing 
CPI-scores for some years. When these are dropped, I am left with 38 580 observations. I am 
also dropping 10 578 observations where the donor is an organisation. After dropping negative 
and 0 commitment observations, the final dataset consists of 27 844 observations.  
After the dataset is created, and some rough cleaning has been done, 5-year averages is taken 
for all variables except GDP per capita. I am then left with 482 observations that covers 167 
recipient countries over 4 time periods. The time periods are 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 
and 2010-2013. This is the dataset that is used when estimating the aid allocation of all donors 
together. In order to estimate regressions for donor groups and individual donors separately, the 
dataset is instead aggregated over recipients for each donor. I am then left with 482 observations 
that covers 39 donors over the same 4 time periods.  
5.5. Descriptive statistics 
In this section I look at trends and tendencies in the data, and compare DAC donors to non-
DAC donors in order to achieve an understanding of the relationships that will be analysed in 
Section 7. In Table 2 I present summary statistics of the relevant variables for DAC and non-
DAC donors separately, so they can be compared. Generally, there does not seem to be large 
differences between the two groups. Even though there are fewer observations for non-DAC 
donors, they appear to give larger sums, as the mean and median are higher than for DAC 
donors. The difference in how corrupt countries the two groups give aid to is not as large as one 
might expect, but DAC donors seem to give aid to somewhat less corrupt countries on average. 
Both give aid to countries that are on the more corrupt side of the scale, and the standard 
deviation and variance is high. They also appear to give aid to poorer countries, with higher 
population. When it comes to democracy both donors seem to give aid to relatively unfree 
countries. DAC donors give somewhat more aid to more economically open countries on 
 
1 The Correlates of War Country codes are used for merging the datasets. The excluded countries are: Anguilla, 
Aruba, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Island, Falkland Islands, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, Guadeloupe, 
Macao, Martinique, Mayotte, Monteserrat, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Marianas, 
Palestinian Administrated Areas, Reunion, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, St. Helena, St. Pierre & Miquelon, 
Tokelau, Turks & Caicos, Virgin Islands, Wallis & Futuna 
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average, and less to countries that have been colonies for a short time than what non-DAC 
donors do.  
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
DAC: 0  
     Mean   Median   SD   Variance   N   Range   Min   Max 
 Aid per Capita 36.38 .719 254.558 64799.97 1715 6766.219 0 6766.219 
 CPI-score 30.71 28 11.926 142.222 1715 92 4 96 
 GDP per Capita 6849.09 4553.557 6763.775 4.57e+07 1715 71561.84 528.126 72089.97 
 Population 44.783 14.12 136.338 18588.1 1715 1382.722 .071 1382.793 
 Political Rights 5.093 5 1.872 3.503 1715 6 2 8 
 Openness 810.803 828 465.962 217000 1715 1636 2 1638 
 Long Colony .91 1 .286 .082 1715 1 0 1 
 Short Colony .141 0 .348 .121 1715 1 0 1 
 
DAC: 1  
 Aid per Capita 1.934 .149 9.354 87.491 24553 462.54 0 462.54 
 CPI-score 31.129 29 11.354 128.911 24553 88.6 4 92.6 
 GDP per Capita 6446.441 4810.72 5434.056 2.95e+07 24553 47680.07 425.895 48105.97 
 Population 69.25 15.229 212.106 44989.06 24553 1382.722 .071 1382.793 
 Political Rights 5.003 5 1.852 3.432 24545 7 1 8 
 Openness 812.379 808 454.002 206000 24553 1638 1 1639 
 Long Colony .913 1 .282 .079 24553 1 0 1 
 Short Colony .127 0 .332 .111 24553 1 0 1 
 
Since non-DAC donors give aid to fewer countries or in fewer time periods, but larger amounts, 
I want to see how large share of total aid that is provided by non-DAC donors. This is important 
for the analysis as non-DAC donors are becoming larger aid suppliers (Manning, 2006) and 
therefore the way they allocate aid becomes increasingly important to the aid community and 
recipients of aid. Figure 1 below shows each donor group’s share of the total aid provided. Even 
though DAC donors provide the largest share, non-DAC donors provide a large enough share 
of total aid to be a significant group of donors in the aid market. This means that the way they 
chose to allocate their aid matters. Nordic donors and other non-DAC donors such as China and 
India account for similar shares of total aid, indicating that the way these donors allocate their 
aid is of similar importance.  
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Figure 1: Donor Groups' Share of Total Aid 
 
Non-DAC donors only accounted for a small share of total aid delivered in the 90s, according 
to Manning (2006). This becomes apparent in Figure 2, which shows the development of DAC 
and non-DAC aid flows over time. While the amount of total aid was smaller in the 90s, non-
DAC donors barely gave aid before the 2000s. Since then, aid from non-DAC donors has 
become more prevalent. However, this is not necessarily just a recent development, as non-
DAC aid accounted for a larger share of total aid before the 90s (Manning, 2006).  
 Figure 2: Aid from DAC and Non-DAC Donors 1995-2013 
 
Figure 3 depicts scatterplots of the correlation between aid per capita and CPI-score for DAC 
and non-DAC donors. This gives a first impression of the relationship between these variables, 
without saying anything about causality or significance. Based on these figures, there does not 
appear to be a clear-cut relationship between aid allocation and corruption. The correlation 
coefficient for DAC donors is -0.07, while it is -0.18 for non-DAC donors. This means that the 
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relationship is weakly negative, but close to zero. It is somewhat more negative for non-DAC 
donors.  
Figure 3: Correlation Between Aid and Corruption for DAC and Non-DAC Donors 
  
6. Estimation Strategy 
For my analyses, I use a similar methodology as what is described in Alesina and Weder (2002). 
I split the analyses in two parts as my research question is twofold. First, I will estimate the aid 
allocation for all donors separately, and then I will split them up into groups and individual 
donors in order to see if there are differences in allocation.  
6.1. Part 1: All donors 
Firstly, I will do ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with five-year averages on repeated 
cross-sectional data in order to investigate if donors give more or less foreign aid to recipient 
countries where corruption is an issue. OLS is an econometric method in which the sum of the 
squared error terms are minimised, so that the estimated regression line is as close as possible 
to the observed data (Stock & Watson, 2012). Doing the analyses with five years averages for 
all the variables will increase the balance of the panel data. This will also make it more likely 
to pick up a result, as corruption often varies slowly over time.  
For this part of the analyses, I control for other factors that can determine the allocation of aid 
per capita. These include income per capita, population, openness of the economy, political 
rights and if the recipient country has been a colony for a long or short time period. In addition, 
I include a dummy for Israel due to the political interests in this country leading to increased 
aid flows. Alesina and Weder (2002) also included a dummy for Egypt, but since the political 
landscape has changed since they did their analysis, I will not do this2. Aid per capita, GDP per 
 




capita and total population are reported as logarithms, making the regression model a log-linear 
model. This simplifies interpretation, as the coefficients can be interpreted as percentages. 
Taking the logarithm also reduces the size of the variables, making them more comprehendible 
and reducing the problem with large outliers. In addition, this will ensure that the variables are 
normally distributed. Doing the analysis with logarithms also makes more sense as we expect 
a non-linear relationship. I do not have access to data on UN votes, so the “Friend of United 
States” and “Friend of Japan” variables from Alesina and Weder (2002) are not included. 
All variables are measured as averages, except for real GDP per capita. This variable is 
measured at the start of each period, since the decision of aid allocation is being made in 
advance based on the recipient countries’ needs. Using initial GDP can alleviate the reverse 
causality issue that arises because the corruption level might influence the country’s income, 
which in turn influences the aid decision.  
The main regression will estimate the time period 1995-2009, in order to avoid potential errors 
due to the changes in CPI-score in 2012 (Saisana & Saltelli, 2012). Dummies for each sub-
period are included in order to control for time period effects. The regression equation will 
therefore be:  
6.1) Log(y)it = β’Xit + time dummiest + εit 
where yit is the dependent variable Aid per capita and Xit is a vector that consist of the 
independent variable corruption, as well as control variables for the log of initial GDP per 
capita, the log of population, trade openness, political rights, colonial history and a dummy for 
Israel.  
In order for the ordinary least squares estimator to be appropriate, there are three assumptions 
that should be met. The first one is that the explanatory variable is determined independently 
from the error term, E (ui | Xi) = 0. The second assumption is that the dependent and independent 
variables, (Yi, Xi), i =1,… ,n are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). The last 
assumption is that large outliers are unlikely (Stock & Watson, 2012).  
There are two issues that arise in this analysis that may lead to the first assumption being broken. 
The first is simultaneous causality, which is a common issue in aid literature. While donors 
claim they attempt to give more aid to less corrupt countries, it could also be the case that aid 
increases corruption, since aid is an inflow of resources that corrupt individuals can take 
advantage of. It is also possible that the analysis suffer from omitted variable bias. I attempt to 
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avoid this by controlling for several factors that could influence the level of corruption and 
follow common practice in aid literature on what variables to include. These potential issues 
are discussed more thoroughly in Section 7.4. 
6.2. Part 2: Donor Groups 
In an attempt to shed some light on my research question, I will categorise the countries in my 
analysis based off of what kind of conditions they set for the recipient countries of their aid. I 
do this by splitting the sample into two large groups: DAC donors and non-DAC donors. I also 
make five subgroups, based on the classification in Section 3.2. These are Nordic donors, other 
DAC-donors, Middle Eastern donors, non-DAC EU donors and other non-DAC donors. Again, 
the regressions are done on 5-year averages. 
Firstly, the regressions are estimated with OLS. The regression equation will therefore be 
almost the same as in the regression with all donors, except that it is estimated for each donor 
group separately. The dummy variable for Israel is dropped as it is mostly relevant for the U.S. 
In addition, the variables for colonial history are dropped since they are only relevant for one 
donor group: other DAC donors.   
Aid per capita is a limited dependent variable which cannot take negative values. If a donor 
does not have any aid transactions to a specific recipient in a certain period, the observation is 
reported as zero. This potentially causes a selection bias, since we only observe the aid 
allocation of the countries that do give aid. The problem can be formalized with a continuous 
latent variable that determines the decision to give aid. This latent variable can be thought of as 
the utility function of giving aid. We cannot observe the donors for which the utility of giving 
aid is too small. This leads to a selection problem if the decision to give aid is dependent on 
unobserved factors that also determine the amount of aid given.  
One way to avoid the potential selection bias is to use a Tobit model. Here all negative values 
of the utility function are reported as zero, so that the observations are left-censored at zero. 
Estimation of the Tobit model is done through maximum likelihood. This estimation approach 
has previously been applied in literature (Dreher et al., 2011). However, more recent literature 
shows that Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood is more suitable than OLS and Tobit when 
there is heteroskedasticity and many zeroes in the data (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2011). This 
model is commonly used with count data because it deals with non-negative data with mange 
zeroes, but the model can also be applied to different forms of data. The model assumes a 
Poisson distribution, and results in consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators if this 
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distribution is correct. However, the Poisson distribution assumes that the conditional mean of 
the distribution is equal to the variance, V(yit | xit) = exp(x’it β). This is called equidispersion 
and does not always hold. A way around equidispersion is Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood, which computes robust standard errors. Therefore, this is the method I apply in 
Section 7.2. The regression equation is:  
6.2)  E(yi | xi) = exp(xi’β) 
where yi is the dependant variable log of Aid per Capita, and xi contains the independent 
variable corruption, control variables, a constant and period dummies.  
6.3. How the Analysis Differs from Previous Literature  
Even though my analysis is similar to that of Alesina and Weder (2002), it still differs on several 
points. First of all, their analysis ranges from 1975 to 1995. My analysis will range between the 
years 1995 to 2013. Since my analysis will be conducted on newer data, we will be able to see 
if there are any changes in trends. For example, one could theorise that foreign aid is less 
connected to corruption in later years, as countries have become more active in anti-corruption 
strategies. On the other hand, it is possible that aid allocation to corrupt countries has increased 
as new donors stand for a larger proportion of total aid in the world.  
In addition, my analysis will provide a broader view of aid and corruption by including more 
countries. From what I can gather from Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Weder 
(2002), the data set used in these articles covers 21 countries. All of these countries are members 
of DAC. While some articles are devoted to studying the aid allocation of non-DAC donors, 
many of these only studies one country (Dreher, 2019; Fuchs & Vadlamannati, 2013; Isaksson 
& Kotsadam, 2018). The allocation of 16 non-DAC donors is analysed and compared to 3 DAC 
donors in Dreher et al. (2011), but prominent donors such as China and India are not included. 
In addition, their analysis focuses on only one time period (2001-2008), leaving out the 
possibility of time effects. My analysis cover 39 countries. 14 of these are not part of DAC and 
considered new donors, such as Chile, Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Emirates and 
China. In addition to increasing the sample size, this will give valuable insight into the 
differences between DAC and non-DAC aid.  
Another way my analysis differs from previous literature is that I use an estimation approach 
that has not previously been applied to aid literature, to the best of my knowledge. 
Differentiating empirical approaches has been pointed out as one of the reasons why there are 
ambiguous results in aid literature. By applying a better estimation approach (Silva & Tenreyro, 
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2006), and comparing the results to previously applied methods, I hope to reduce the problem 
with differentiating approaches and results.  
7. Results 
7.1. Aid allocation for All Donors 
Using OLS on repeated cross-sectional data as described in Section 7.2.1, I estimate the aid 
allocation of all donors together. I do so for the period 1995-2009 because the CPI-index went 
through some changes in 2012 (Saisana & Saltelli, 2012), possibly altering results3.  
Table 3: Aid Allocation of All Donors 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
       No 
Controls 
   With 
Controls 
   Control of 
Corruption 
   Voice and 
Accountability 
   FDI    Oil and 
Mineral 
   FE 
 CPI-score -0.051*** -0.045***  -0.051*** -0.041*** -0.043*** 0.015 
   (0.010) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.022) 
 Log Income  -0.206 -0.234* -0.184 -0.051 -0.256* 0.339 
    (0.129) (0.129) (0.131) (0.149) (0.142) (0.524) 
 Log Population  -0.623*** -0.643*** -0.655*** -0.477*** -0.623*** 3.425* 
    (0.072) (0.066) (0.065) (0.082) (0.072) (1.970) 
 Openness  0.003 0.005 0.005  0.002 -0.018* 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.010) 
 Political Rights  0.125** 0.027  0.138** 0.098* 0.045 
    (0.059) (0.062)  (0.061) (0.057) (0.155) 
 Long Colony  0.535 0.410 0.484* 0.816** 0.476 12.937** 
    (0.412) (0.294) (0.291) (0.323) (0.416) (6.109) 
 Short Colony  -0.332 -0.144 -0.186 -0.524* -0.321 -3.541*** 
    (0.302) (0.256) (0.255) (0.268) (0.315) (1.306) 
 Israel  -1.309 -1.580* -1.366 -1.497 -1.246  
    (1.597) (0.934) (0.942) (0.956) (1.570)  
 Control of   -1.175***     
 Corruption    (0.181)     
        
 Voice and     -0.323**    
 Accountability    (0.155)    
        
 FDI     -0.000   
       (0.000)   
 Oil      0.014  
        (0.011)  
 Mineral      0.071***  
        (0.022)  
 Constant 16.084*** 18.312*** 17.001*** 18.766*** 16.405*** 18.786*** -3.373 
   (0.394) (1.313) (1.207) (1.111) (1.408) (1.412) (9.662) 
 Obs. 325 323 298 299 248 316 323 
 R-squared  0.189 0.455 0.511 0.513 0.439 0.460 0.841 
 Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The table reports ordinary least squares estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per capita in 5-
year periods from 1995-2009. Column (1) displays the relationship without controls, and column (2) displays the 
regression with controls. In column (3) corruption is instead measured with Control of Corruption. In Column (4), 
Political Rights is replaced with Voice and Accountability to measure democracy. Column (5) replaces the variable 
for trade openness with foreign direct investment. In Column (6), oil and mineral rents are added as additional 
 
3 See Table 13 in Appendix A for an analysis of different time periods. 
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controls to those in Column (2). Column (7) displays is the same specification as Column (2), except that recipient 
fixed effects are accounted for. All specifications are estimated with dummies for each time period. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
Firstly, I estimate without any controls in order to take advantage of the whole sample size. The 
results are shown in Column (1) of Table 3. The results show a significantly negative effect of 
CPI-score on aid allocation. This shows that more corrupt countries receive more aid. These 
results are different than what Alesina and Weder (2002) find. The negative effect could be 
because we have non-DAC countries in our dataset, as will be tested for in Section 7.2.  
In addition to corruption, aid allocation is likely to be determined by the recipient’s needs, 
country size, democracy, colonial history4, and geopolitical areas of interest. Therefore, I add 
controls for GDP per capita, population, trade openness, political rights, Israel, and long and 
short colony in Column (2). Doing so decreases the sample with two observations but increases 
the model’s explanatory power from 0.189 to 0.455. With the inclusion of control variables , I 
still find that more corrupt countries receive more aid. A 1-point increase in CPI-score is 
associated with a 4,5% decrease in aid per capita. This is a sizeable effect, but not compared to 
the small country bias, in which countries with 1% larger population receives 62% less aid. 
This is consistent with previously found small country biases (Alesina & Weder, 2002; 
Berthélemy, 2006; Dreher et al., 2011). The effect of GDP on aid allocation is surprising, as it 
is not significant. This indicates that donors do not consider recipients’ needs. Previous 
literature has found that foreign aid is decreasing in income (Alesina & Weder, 2002; 
Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Berthélemy, 2006). Economic openness is not considered, but more 
aid is allocated to less democratic countries, significant at 5%. Neither variable for colonial 
history are significant, and Israel is not treated differently. This suggest that the level of 
democracy is the only political factor that matters for aggregated aid allocation.  
In order to verify my results, I perform various robustness checks. A possible issue with my 
analysis is that it depends on factors that are difficult to measure, such as corruption, economic 
and political interest in a country. CPI is a perception-based indicator, which can lead to several 
issues discussed in Section 7.4. Political Rights is scored based on considerations of researchers 
and advisors and could therefore suffer from human error. Therefore, I test for measurement 
errors, by substituting the explanatory variable and controls with other variables that measure 
 
4 Colonial history is split up into countries that have been a colony for a long time and countries that have been a 
colony for a short time, as colonial ties are likely to be stronger the longer the colonial time lasted. I find that 
splitting the variable like this increases the explanatory power of the model from when there is just one indicator 
of colonial history.  
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the same effects. In Column (3) of Table 3 I estimate the regression in Column (2) but use 
Control of Corruption as the explanatory variable5. In Column (4), trade openness is replaced 
by Foreign Direct Investments as a measure of economic interest, and in Column (5) Voice and 
Accountability is used to measure democracy. The results of these estimations still show that 
more corrupt countries receive more aid in all periods. This indicates that there is no 
measurement error related to the chosen variables.  
There is also a possibility of omitted variable bias. When it comes to aid allocation, there are 
many factors that could influence the decision, and one cannot always control for everything. I 
follow common practice in aid literature to control for factors of altruism and merit, as well as 
economic and political self-interest (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Dreher et al., 2011). Still, it is 
possible that excluded variables influence aid allocation, and excluding this variable leads to 
over- or underestimation of corruption (Verbeek, 2008). It has been suggested that access to 
natural resources is a motivation for aid allocation (Naim, 2007; Woods, 2008). I therefore 
include variables for oil and mineral rents as a robustness check to see if these could be omitted 
variables. The results from this estimation is shown in Column (6). The results from this test 
shows that the effect of corruption on aid allocation is not affected by the inclusion of these 
controls. Rents from extraction of minerals and oil is therefore not omitted variables. Mineral 
rents increase the amount of aid received.  
Another possible issue with the analysis is that there could be other characteristics of the 
recipient country that is correlated with corruption and drives the results. In order to control for 
this, I attempt the analysis with recipient fixed effects. The results are shown in Column (7). 
With this specification, the results change drastically. Now corruption is no longer a significant 
determinant of aid allocation. More populated countries receive more aid, significant at the 10% 
level. This is the exact opposite of what one would expect and contradicts all literature. This 
could mean that there are some factors related to the recipient countries that captures the effect 
we found in corruption. These factors could be highly correlated with corruption, and this could 
explain the results. Another explanation is that the variables we are interested in moves so 
slowly that they are almost fixed. Therefore, holding effects fixed for each country removes the 
variation in corruption, and possibly the other variables as well. If this is the case, it reduces the 
likelihood that recipient fixed effects is an issue with my analysis.  
 
5 Although Control of Corruption is also a perception-based indicator, more confidence can be attributed to the 
results if several perception based indicators give the same results.  
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7.2. Aid Allocation of Donor Groups 
Using OLS and Pseudo Poisson Maximum likelihood estimations as described in Section 7.2.2, 
I estimate the aid allocation of DAC and non-DAC donors separately. As in Section 7 I have 
done so for the years 1995-2009, with the same controls. However, I have excluded the dummy 
for Israel, as it is only relevant for the U.S. and therefore does not make sense to include for 
non-DAC donors. The results are shown in Table 4 below6.  
Table 4: Aid Allocation of DAC and non-DAC Donors 
                                                             OLS                                            PPML 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
       DAC    non-DAC    DAC    non-DAC 
 CPI-score -.01 -.021 -.001 -.002 
   (.008) (.02) (.001) (.002) 
 Log Income -.456*** -.348 -.027*** -.028 
   (.105) (.3) (.006) (.022) 
 Log Population -.421*** -.638*** -.026*** -.048*** 
   (.054) (.157) (.004) (.012) 
 Openness -.001 .009 0 .001 
   (.002) (.007) (0) (0) 
 Democracy -.045 .526*** -.002 .038*** 
   (.047) (.132) (.003) (.01) 
 Long Colony .417 1.02 .03 .081 
   (.273) (.675) (.02) (.069) 
 Short Colony -.087 -1.458*** -.004 -.109** 
   (.212) (.542) (.015) (.045) 
 Constant 21.545*** 15.758*** 3.103*** 2.792*** 
   (.939) (2.595) (.056) (.19) 
 Observations 295 232 292 230 
 R-squared/ Pseudo R2 .284 .295 .28 .287 
Note: The table reports estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per capita in 
5-year periods from 1995 to 2009. Column (1) and (2) are estimated with ordinary least 
squares. Column (3) and (4) are estimated with PPML. Column (1) and (3) display results for 
DAC donors, while column (2) and (4) display results for non-DAC donors. The dummy 
for Israel is not included as it is not relevant for all donors. Standard errors are in 
parentheses (Robust for PPML) *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
      
The inference of all variables is the same for both specifications and show that neither DAC 
nor non-DAC donors consider corruption in their aid allocation. DAC donors appear to consider 
recipients’ needs in their aid decision, while non-DAC donors do not. Less populated countries 
receive more aid, consistent with literature (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Berthélemy & Tichit, 
2004; Berthélemy, 2006). I find that non-DAC donors give more aid to less democratic 
countries. Countries that have been colonies for a short time period receives less aid from non-
DAC donors. The results are not in line with the conditions DAC donors set, and the theory that 
DAC donors behave more altruistic, except that they do allocate based on recipients’ needs. 
 
6 All results in this section are robust to the same tests as in Section 7.1. The results of these robustness checks 
can be found in Appendix B.  
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The criticism against non-DAC donors seems to be unfounded when it comes to corruption, but 
not when it comes to income and democracy.  
For the sake of simplicity, I will only focus on one estimation strategy in the next parts of the 
analysis7. The results of the OLS and PPML estimations are similar, and they fit common 
perceptions and theories of aid allocation, adding confidence to these results. Due to the 
censored nature of the data, the OLS estimation could be biased. This is evident when 
comparing the results from OLS and PPML estimations, as OLS overestimates the effects. 
When dealing with data with many zeros, PPML has been shown to outperform OLS and Tobit 
estimations (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2011). Therefore, I will use this estimation approach for 
the rest of the analysis. 
As neither donor group explain the effect of corruption on aid allocation observed for all donors 
collectively in Table 3, I suspect that the results could be driven by some specific countries. 
Previous literature has found that Nordic donors behave more altruistically than other DAC 
donors, allocating more aid to less corrupt recipients (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Neumayer, 
2003a). This could reflect differences in underlying motivations for giving aid. Similarly, 
differences in aid regimes among non-DAC donors have been pointed out (Apodaca 2017). 
Therefore, the next part of the analysis will investigate if there are differences in aid allocation 
within the DAC and non-DAC groups. I will use the donor categorisation based on 











7 Results for OLS and Tobit estimations can be found in Appendix C. The OLS results are similar to the results 
of PPML, but the Tobit results differ when estimating allocation of donor groups. For these estimations, over 
half of the observations are left-censored due to zeros in the dataset. This, in conjunction with Tobit estimations 
being less appropriate, could explain the differences in results.  
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Table 5: Aid Allocation of Donor Groups 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
       Nordic    Other DAC    Middle- 
East 
   Non-DAC 
EU 
   Other 
Non-DAC 
 CPI-score 0 -.001 .003** .003*** -.001 
   (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
 Log Income -.103*** -.024*** .063*** .002 -.024 
   (.013) (.006) (.02) (.022) (.022) 
 Log Population -.027*** -.025*** -.04*** -.111*** -.045*** 
   (.007) (.003) (.009) (.013) (.013) 
 Openness .001** 0 0 0 .001 
   (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
 Democracy -.011* -.002 -.004 .027*** .019* 
   (.006) (.003) (.01) (.009) (.01) 
 Long Colony .026 .031 .053 -.022 .027 
   (.041) (.02) (.04) (.033) (.088) 
 Short Colony .026 -.005 -.02 .042 -.068 
   (.031) (.015) (.047) (.033) (.048) 
 Constant 3.464*** 3.072*** 2.098*** 2.083*** 2.874*** 
   (.102) (.056) (.152) (.188) (.194) 
 Observations 260 292 57 119 195 
 R-squared .298 .27 .537 .543 .156 
Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the 
log of aid per capita in 5-year periods. Column (1) displays results for Nordic donors, column (2) displays 
results for other DAC donors, column (3) displays results for Middle East and OPEC donors, column (4) 
displays results for non-DAC donors that are members of EU, and column (5) displays results for other 
non-DAC donors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
Here I surprisingly find that Middle Eastern and non-DAC EU donors give more aid to less 
corrupt countries, while the other donor groups do not consider corruption in their aid 
allocation. Based on this, the criticism towards non-DAC donors appears unwarranted. The 
results also contradict the empirical finding that Nordic donors give more aid to less corrupt 
countries. Lower income countries receive more aid from both DAC groups, while Middle 
Eastern donors give more to higher income countries. Population is significantly negative for 
all specifications, as expected. Nordic donors reward good economic policies and democracy, 
the latter significant at 10%. Non-DAC EU and other non-DAC countries gives more aid to less 
democratic recipients, partly confirming the criticism towards these donors. The other donor 
groups to not consider democracy when allocating aid. Neither donor group takes colonial 
history into consideration in their aid allocation. Splitting the donor groups this way does not 
explain the finding that more corrupt countries receive more aid in Table 3.  
7.2.1. Do Donors Allocate Heterogeneously? 
Since splitting the donors up in groups based on similarity does not explain the results in Table 
3, I suspect that donors allocate heterogeneously even within these groups. In order to 
investigate donor heterogeneity, I estimate the allocation of individual donors within the donor 




Table 6: Aid Allocation of Nordic Donors 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
       Norway    Denmark    Sweden    Finland    Iceland 
 CPI-score -.001 .002 -.001 .001 .023*** 
   (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.006) 
 Log Income -.095*** -.102*** -.094*** -.082*** -.348*** 
   (.015) (.023) (.019) (.015) (.022) 
 Log Population  -.04*** -.05*** -.059*** -.045*** -.247*** 
   (.007) (.011) (.01) (.008) (.065) 
 Openness 0 0 .001 0 .012*** 
   (0) (0) (0) (0) (.002) 
 Democracy -.01 -.016** -.015** .003 .357*** 
   (.007) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.052) 
 Long Colony .026 .003 .01 -.033 .76*** 
   (.043) (.06) (.038) (.038) (.058) 
 Short Colony .089*** -.078 .067* .034 .339*** 
   (.03) (.062) (.035) (.033) (.066) 
 Constant 3.369*** 3.442*** 3.414*** 3.104*** 2.044*** 
   (.124) (.184) (.15) (.135) (.696) 
 Observations 249 156 224 220 13 
 R-squared .289 .273 .295 .202 .908 
Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the 
log of aid per capita in 5-year periods. Column (1) displays results for Norway, column (2) displays results 
for Denmark, column (3) displays results for Sweden, column (4) displays results for Finland, and column 
(5) displays results for Iceland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
When estimating the results for individual Nordic donors, it becomes apparent that they behave 
similarly. None of the Nordic donors consider corruption when allocating aid except Iceland. 
However, there are only 11 observations of aid from Iceland in the data, so the results for 
Iceland may be biased. I therefore overlook the results for Iceland’s aid allocation. All Nordic 
donors give more aid to poorer and smaller countries. Denmark and Sweden give more aid to 
more democratic countries, and Sweden gives less aid to countries that have been colonies for 
a short time (at 10% significance).  
Next, I estimate the aid allocation of other DAC donors. As there are so many donors in this 
group, only the effect of corruption on aid allocation is shown in Table 7 below. Most of these 
donors do not consider corruption when giving aid. Greece, Spain and the U.S. give more aid 
to more corrupt countries. The result for the U.S. is in line with Alesina and Weder (2002). 







Table 7: Aid Allocation of Other DAC Donors 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
       Australia    Austria    Belgium    Canada    France 
 CPI-score 0 .001 0 .001 .001 
   (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
 Observations 164 247 237 258 274 
 Pseudo R2 .179 .101 .263 .229 .212 
      (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10) 
       Germany    Greece    Ireland    Italy    Japan 
 CPI-score 0 -.004* 0 -.002 .001 
   (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
 Observations 269 181 162 245 213 
 Pseudo R2 .077 .329 .307 .215 .185 
      (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15) 
       Korea    Luxembourg    Netherlands    New 
Zealand 
   Portugal 
 CPI-score 0 .004 -.001 0 .007** 
   (.002) (.003) (.001) (.002) (.003) 
 Observations 115 152 238 136 129 
 Pseudo R2 .016 .357 .271 .363 .338 
      (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)   (20) 
       Slovak 
Republic 
   Spain    Switzerland    UK    U.S. 
 CPI-score -.004 -.003** -.001 .001 -.003*** 
   (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
 Observations 22 250 227 244 283 
 Pseudo R2 .884 .12 .283 .256 .184 
Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the 
log of aid per capita in 5-year periods. Controls are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
  
Since there are only four donors who consider corruption in their allocation, I want to see what 
leads them to allocate the way they do. Therefore, I report the full results for these donors in 
Table 8 below. Among the donors that give more aid to more corrupt countries, the U.S. is the 
only one that gives more aid to poor recipients. Greece gives more aid to higher income 
countries, while Spain does not consider income. Both Spain and the U.S. rewards democracies, 
while Greece does the opposite. Both Spain and the U.S give more to countries with a long 
colonial history, while Greece gives more to countries that have been colonies for a short time 
period. Portugal, on the other hand, manages to reward less corrupt countries and still take 
recipient’s needs into consideration. This suggests that the trade-off between rewarding good 
institutions and giving aid to the poorest is possible to overcome. Portugal does not consider 
democracy in their allocation and gives more aid to countries that has been colonies for a short 





Table 8: Aid Allocation of Other DAC Donors of Interest 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
       Greece    Portugal    Spain    U.S. 
 CPI-score -.004* .007** -.003** -.003*** 
   (.002) (.003) (.001) (.001) 
 Log Income .053** -.128** .01 -.027*** 
   (.024) (.051) (.017) (.01) 
 Log Population -.085*** -.132*** -.035*** -.014** 
   (.013) (.025) (.01) (.006) 
 Openness -.001 .001 -.001 0 
   (.001) (.001) (0) (0) 
 Democracy .031*** .003 -.018** -.014*** 
   (.012) (.022) (.009) (.005) 
 Long Colony .055 .074 .098* .062** 
   (.061) (.114) (.058) (.031) 
 Short Colony  .123*** .155** -.042 -.02 
   (.045) (.072) (.045) (.025) 
 Constant 1.942*** 3.117*** 2.63*** 3.008*** 
   (.186) (.393) (.161) (.087) 
 Observations 181 129 250 283 
 R-squared .329 .338 .12 .184 
Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of 
CPI-score on the log of aid per capita in 5-year periods. Column (1) displays results for 
Greece, column (2) displays results for Portugal, column (3) displays results for Spain, and 
column (4) displays results for the U.S. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
In Table 9 the results of the estimation of Middle Eastern and OPEC donors are shown. Kuwait 
rewards less corrupt countries, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do not 
consider corruption when allocating aid. Kuwait and the UAE give more aid to higher income 
countries. None of these donors consider democracy, and the UAE gives more aid to former 
colonies. There are few observations for these donors, so the results could be biased. 
Table 9: Aid Allocation of OPEC and Middle Eastern Donors 
      (1)   (2)   (3) 
       Kuwait    Saudi 
Arabia 
   UAE 
 CPI-score .007** -.001 .001 
   (.003) (.001) (.003) 
 Log Income .09** .024* .098*** 
   (.045) (.015) (.035) 
 Log Population -.022 -.059*** -.025** 
   (.021) (.008) (.012) 
 Openness -.001 0 0 
   (.001) (0) (.001) 
 Democracy -.008 .006 -.002 
   (.022) (.006) (.012) 
 Long Colony -.108 .025 .22*** 
   (.104) (.035) (.062) 
 Short Colony -.061 -.019 .176* 
   (.068) (.021) (.102) 
 Constant 1.902*** 2.472*** 1.65*** 
   (.218) (.094) (.32) 
 Observations 24 38 24 
 R-squared .443 .767 .602 
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Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of 
the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per capita in 5-year periods. 
Column (1) displays results for Kuwait, column (2) displays results for 
Saudi Arabia, and column (3) displays results for the United Arab 




Estimations of aid allocation of donors that are members of the EU but not DAC are reported 
in Table 10. Openness and democracy are dropped for Latvia, due to collinearity. This is likely 
because there are only 4 observations for Latvia. The dummy for long colonial history is 
dropped for Estonia. Latvia, Lithuania, Liechtenstein and Monaco all reward less corrupt 
countries, but do not manage to combine this with recipients’ needs. Estonia is the only donor 
that gives more aid to poorer recipients, but they do not consider corruption. Latvia and 
Lithuania give more aid to higher income countries. Lithuania rewards good economic policies, 
while Monaco does the opposite at 10% significance. Lithuania also gives more aid to more 
democratic countries, while the opposite is true for Liechtenstein. Lithuania gives more aid to 
former colonies, while Monaco only gives more aid to long-term colonies. Liechtenstein on the 
other hand gives more aid to short-term colonies and less to countries with a long colonial 
history. Estonia gives less aid to former short-term colonies at 10% level of significance. All 
donors except Liechtenstein have few aid observations, and the results could therefore be 
biased.    
Table 10: Aid Allocation of Non-DAC EU Donors 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
       Estonia    Latvia    Lithuania    
Liechtenstein 
   Monaco 
 CPI-score .024 .038*** .025*** .003** .007** 
   (.017) (0) (0) (.001) (.003) 
 Log Income -.201*** .076*** .53*** .005 .031 
   (.072) (0) (.003) (.02) (.041) 
 Log Population -.05 -.045*** -.168*** -.119*** -.158*** 
   (.077) (0) (.001) (.012) (.031) 
 Openness .002  .005*** 0 -.003* 
   (.001)  (0) (.001) (.002) 
 Democracy .053  -.047*** .026*** .021 
   (.05)  (.001) (.009) (.019) 
 Long Colony   .031*** -.078** .236*** 
     (.001) (.032) (.088) 
 Short Colony -.155*  .048*** .079** -.09 
   (.084)  (.002) (.035) (.085) 
 Constant 2.668*** .28*** -3.101*** 2.066*** 1.92*** 
   (.558) (0) (.03) (.166) (.284) 
 Observations 10 4 9 102 28 
 Pseudo R2 .846 .044 1 .622 .628 
Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the 
log of aid per capita in 5-year periods. Column (1) displays results for Estonia, column (2) displays results 
for Latvia, column (3) displays results for Lithuania, column (4) displays results for Liechtenstein, and 





The aid allocation of other non-DAC donors is reported in Table 11. In line with claims of 
critics (Naim, 2007), China gives more aid to more corrupt countries, significantly at 10%. This 
is also true for Thailand, while Chile gives more aid to less corrupt countries at the 10% level. 
Taiwan is the only donor in this group that considers recipients’ needs, and only does so at 10% 
level of significance. Also at the 10% level, China rewards good economic policies. Both Chile 
and South Africa gives more aid to less democratic countries, but the rest of the donors do not 
consider democracy in their aid allocation. Chile and India gives less aid to countries with a 
long colonial history, while countries that has only been a colony for a short amount of time 
receives more aid from Chile, India and Taiwan.  
Table 11: Aid Allocation of Other Non-DAC Donors 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
       Chile    India    China    Taiwan    Thailand    South 
Africa 
 CPI-score .008* 0 -.002* .012 -.019** .002 
   (.004) (.004) (.001) (.007) (.008) (.009) 
 Log Income -.035 -.013 .011 -.327* .033 -.086 
   (.06) (.044) (.018) (.197) (.055) (.064) 
 Log Population -.098*** -.076*** -.032*** -.049 -.198*** -.105*** 
   (.036) (.017) (.01) (.038) (.041) (.04) 
 Openness .001 -.001 .001* .003 .001 .001 
   (.001) (.001) (0) (.003) (.001) (.001) 
 Democracy .095* .011 .001 -.002 .038 .057** 
   (.051) (.015) (.008) (.131) (.044) (.027) 
 Long Colony -.23* -.173** .055  .112  
   (.12) (.068) (.084)  (.131)  
 Short Colony .13* .137** -.062 .197** -.053  
   (.069) (.066) (.041) (.098) (.114)  
 Constant 2.027*** 2.942*** 2.679*** 4.679** 2.428*** 2.902*** 
   (.605) (.308) (.16) (2.078) (.25) (.4) 
 Observations 34 54 165 17 21 15 
 R-squared .423 .371 .174 .33 .786 .727 
Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per 
capita in 5-year periods. Column (1) displays results for Chile, column (2) displays results for India, column (3) displays 
results for China, column (4) displays results for Taiwan, column (5) displays results for Thailand, and column (6) displays 
results for South Africa. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
7.2.2. Do Allocation Patterns Change Over Time?  
Due to constant changes in the aid market and political climate, and the fact that these changes 
can take time to show results (Charron, 2011; Easterly & Williamson, 2011) it is possible that 
aid allocation patterns change over time, and that these changes are not observable at once. In 
fact, previous empirical studies have found different results for different time periods (Alesina 
& Weder, 2002; Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004). Therefore, I estimate the PPML estimations from 
Table 4 for different time periods separately in Table 12, in order to identify possible differences 
in aid allocation over time. This shows that in 1995-1999, DAC donors gave more aid to more 
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corrupt countries while non-DAC donors rewarded less corrupt countries. This is the opposite 
of expected based on aforementioned theory and literature. However, there are very few 
observations for non-DAC donors in this period, as these donors only accounted for a small 
portion of total aid in the 90s (Manning, 2006). Therefore, the result non-DAC donors may not 
be accurate for this period. It is possible that DAC donors gave more aid to more corrupt 
countries in the 90s because several new donors were included in the organisation in this period, 
and that the structural changes in the aid community during this period took a long time to be 
implemented and give observable results. In the other time periods, neither DAC nor non-DAC 
donors consider corruption in their aid allocation. This reflects that DAC donors have improved, 
and that criticism towards non-DAC donors is unwarranted. Rather, it appears that there is large 
heterogeneity in donors’ allocation, as shown in Section 7.2.1, so that criticism should be 
directed to specific self-interested donors.  
Table 12: Aid Allocation of DAC and non-DAC Donors Over Time 
                                                1995-1999                               2000-2004                             2005-2009                             2010-2013 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
       DAC    non-DAC    DAC    non-DAC    DAC    non-DAC    DAC    non-DAC 
 CPI-score -0.001** 0.022*** -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 Log Income 0.011 -0.508*** -0.040*** -0.006 -0.035*** -0.026 -0.035*** 0.010 
   (0.014) (0.185) (0.010) (0.037) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.018) 
 Log Population -0.043*** -0.030 -0.027*** -0.048** -0.018*** -0.042*** -0.015*** -0.040*** 
   (0.007) (0.065) (0.009) (0.024) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008) 
 Openness -0.001*** 0.005* -0.000 0.001 0.000** 0.000 0.000** -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Democracy 0.008* 0.010 -0.006 0.046*** -0.003 0.021** -0.003 0.011 
   (0.005) (0.065) (0.007) (0.016) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) 
 Long Colony 0.010 0.291** 0.052 0.000 0.024 0.059 0.022 0.094 
   (0.043) (0.126) (0.035) (0.109) (0.021) (0.082) (0.019) (0.084) 
 Short Colony -0.112*** 0.171 0.019 -0.089 0.033* -0.142** 0.036** -0.096 
   (0.034) (0.142) (0.025) (0.066) (0.017) (0.064) (0.015) (0.066) 
 Constant 2.888*** 5.324*** 3.179*** 2.608*** 3.106*** 2.991*** 3.096*** 2.679*** 
   (0.126) (1.402) (0.117) (0.350) (0.054) (0.181) (0.058) (0.132) 
 Obs. 71 17 101 87 120 126 117 120 
 R-squared  0.460 0.683 0.257 0.256 0.452 0.311 0.426 0.181 
Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per 
capita in 5-year periods. Column (1) and (2) display the period 1995-1999, column (3) and (4) display the period 2000-2004, 
and column (5) and (6) display the period 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1  
 
7.3. Summary of Results 
When estimating the collective aid allocation of all donors, I find that corrupt countries receive 
more aid. The recipient’s needs are not taken into account, and neither is trade openness. 
Undemocratic countries receive more aid. The results are not changed in robustness checks. 
The exception is when including recipient fixed effects. In this specification the results change 
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drastically from the baseline specification, and corruption no longer matters in aid decisions. 
This could be because the corruption variable moves so slowly that it in essence is a fixed effect.  
Estimating aid allocation of DAC and non-DAC donors using OLS and PPML, I find that 
neither consider corruption in their aid allocation, indifferently of the estimation method. DAC 
donors appear to care most about recipients’ needs, not taking anything other than this and 
country size into consideration. Non-DAC donors, on the other hand, gives more aid to less 
democratic countries that have been colonies for a short time and has a small population. When 
further separating the donors into groups, I find that Middle Eastern donors and EU donors that 
are not members of DAC reward recipients with less corruption. However, they do not give 
more aid to the recipients in most need, (in fact Middle Eastern donors do the opposite) and 
non-DAC EU donors give more aid to less democratic recipients. Both categories of DAC 
donors take recipients' needs into consideration, but only Nordic donors reward democracy. 
Nordic donors also reward good economic policies. Neither DAC nor other non-DAC donors 
consider corruption in their allocation. The latter does not consider recipients’ needs either, and 
gives more aid to less democratic countries.  
It becomes clear that any one donor group does not drive the tendency of more corrupt countries 
to receive more aid. When estimating the aid allocation of each donor country individually, we 
see that donors allocate aid heterogeneously. Most donors do not consider corruption in their 
allocation, regardless of what group they are in or the conditions they set. EU donors that are 
not members of DAC are most successful in rewarding less corrupt countries collectively as a 
group. Chile, Kuwait and Portugal also seem to donate more to countries that perform well on 
the Corruption Perceptions Index. On the other hand, Greece, Spain, the U.S., China and 
Thailand allocate more to more corrupt countries. There are large differences among these 
donors in what other variables they consider when giving aid. This finding shows that there are 
donors within both DAC and non-DAC groups that go against the conditions of multilateral 
organisations and DAC.  
When investigating if the patterns of aid allocation have changed over time, I find that DAC 
donors gave more aid to more corrupt countries in the 90s. This is somewhat surprising as the 
problem of poor institutions and aid gained a lot of attention in this period, and the DAC 
organisation started to work towards greater selectivity in allocation. However, it is possible 
that these changes take time to implement, and that the observed effect is simply a delayed one.  
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7.4. Sources of Error 
A problem that all aid literature faces is the issue of simultaneous causality. The observed 
effects of corruption on aid allocation could actually reflect the effect of aid on corruption. The 
literature is mixed on the effects of aid on corruption, with some researchers finding that aid 
increases corruption (Alesina & Weder, 2002) and worsens institutions (Knack, 2001), while 
others find that aid decreases corruption (Tavares, 2003). Even though this could be an issue, 
corruption is a persistent problem so it is possible that aid allocation will not change corruption 
much when looking at the aggregated picture. It is unlikely that countries donate more aid to 
countries with a high degree of corruption in order to reduce corruption in this country. 
According to Alesina and Weder (2002), this makes the problem with reverse causality less 
serious for corruption. In addition, my dependant variable is aid commitment and not 
disbursement, so the investigated variable is the donors’ decisions and not the actual aid that 
could increase corruption.  
Another issue specific to corruption literature is that corruption is difficult to measure. First of 
all, it is a crime in many countries, so it is hard to determine the extent of the problem and there 
are likely dark figures. In addition, corruption is hard to measure in numbers as its consequences 
are larger than the amount of money that changes hand. Because of these measurement issues, 
there are several ways to measure corruption, but none of them can be completely relied on to 
show the true extent of corruption. A common way to measure corruption is perception-based 
indicators. This is a way to rate the extent of corruption in certain areas/countries based on 
survey questions of how corruption is perceived. The survey could be answered by 
professionals or ordinary citizens, based on their experiences. Although these indicators are a 
good way to get a “on location” view of corruption, they can also suffer from biases. Naturally, 
indicators that are based on people’s impressions rather than facts are not always correct. 
However, they have been showed to be highly correlated with more objective measures of 
corruption. There could also be consistency issues when analysing this type of indicators over 
time because the sources used are not necessarily the same for all years. Still, perception based 
indicators are more appropriate to measure corruption at the aggregated level than objective 
indicators (Hamilton & Hammer, 2018).  
Since corruption is more likely to be a problem in lower income countries, these variables are 
expected to be closely related. Similarly, corruption is likely to be correlated with oil and 
mineral rents, because of the resource curse. In addition, corruption is more often a problem in 
autocratic countries than democracies, because autocrats have more discretionary power. 
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Because there are several variables that are expected to be correlated, there could be a problem 
with multicollinearity. Therefore, the correlation coefficients of all the included control 
variables are reported in Table 18 in the Appendix. This shows that while the variables are 
correlated as expected, it is not to a large enough degree for it to pose a problem for the analysis. 
Another possible source of error is omitted variable bias, as with most empirical studies. I 
attempt to tackle one possible omitted variable in the robustness checks in Section 7.1 and 
Appendix B, but it is possible that there could be other omitted variables. Still, as I have 
followed common practice in aid literature on which controls to include, I am confident that 
omitted variable bias is not a bigger problem in this thesis than in other aid literature.  
A potential source of error that is more specific to this thesis is related to the chosen estimation 
method. Even though Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood is proven to be the best estimation 
method when dealing with censored data (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2011), there are some 
potential issues with this estimation method. As discussed in Section 6.2, I used Pseudo Poisson 
Maximum Likelihood in order to overcome the issue of equidispersion in the regular Poisson 
model8, thereby avoiding a common problem with this model. In addition to possible estimation 
problems with the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood, it could also be that this approach is 
not the best suited for the analysis. However, I use several different estimation models and get 
similar results, strengthening my confidence in these results. 
Some donors have been included as DAC donors in more recent years. In order to keep the 
analysis consistent, the classification of DAC and non-DAC donors is based on the status in 
2021. This means that some donors that I have classified as DAC donors have not have this 
status for the whole period assessed. These are Greece, Korea, Iceland, the Czech Republic and 
the Slovak Republic. Still, it is commonplace for donors to be observers and participants of 
DAC before joining, and certain criteria needs to be met (OECD). Therefore, donors that had 
the intention of joining DAC would likely follow their practices. In addition, my findings show 
that there is not a clear divide between DAC and non-DAC donors. Therefore, I do not think 
this classification distorts my results notably.  
Taking the average of aid does not take into consideration the volatile nature of aid transfers, 
according to Brück and Xu (2012). If this is the case, it could affect my results, as well at other 
findings in the aid literature. Still, as using 5-year averages is the standard approach in aid 
 
8 It can be seen from Table 2 that the data is overdispersed, since the variance is larger than the mean.  
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literature, and because of the empirical reasoning behind this, I find this to be the most 
appropriate estimation approach.   
Another estimation approach that has emerged in aid literature is to estimate the aid decision as 
a two-step model (Berthélemy, 2006). This method suggest that the explanatory variables have 
a different impact on the probability of being selected as a recipient, and on how much aid 
selected recipients receive. This is not taken into consideration in my analysis. Therefore, it 
could be the case that corruption influences the decision on who to give aid to and how much 
to give differently. It is hard to tell how corruption influences the two steps in the allocation 
decision, however, as neither Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) nor Berthélemy (2006) include 
corruption as an explanatory variable.  
8. Discussion 
The results of all donors collectively made it apparent that donors do not consider recipients’ 
needs, and that they actually give more aid to more corrupt countries. This finding contradicts 
acknowledged literature based on older data (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Svensson, 1999) but is 
in line with more recent findings (Clist, 2011; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Easterly & Williamson, 
2011). The theory of Samaritan’s dilemma predicts a trade-off between income sensitivity and 
conditionality (Svensson, 2000), but these results show that donors do not perform well in either 
of these regards. If foreign aid does not accomplish any of its goals, what is then the purpose? 
From the donors’ perspective, aid seems to be motivated by self-interest. Population size, 
democratic level, colonial history and political interest appear to be determinants of aid, 
reflecting the motivations of donor countries. These determinants of aid are much in line with 
previous literature (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Barthel et al., 2014; Clist, 2011). Based on these 
findings, there clearly seems to be a trade-off between altruistic aid allocation to recipients in 
need with good governance, and aid allocation based on self-interested motivations.  
Contradictory to other literature (Dreher et al., 2011), I find that neither DAC nor non-DAC 
donors shows consider corruption in aid allocation, but that there are large differences in how 
they allocate based on other parameters. DAC donors give more aid to recipients in need, in 
line with Dreher et al. (2011). The way they allocate aid therefore points in the direction of a 
trade-off between conditionality and income selectivity. They do not consider any other 
indicators of self-interest than population size, suggesting that these donors are relatively 
altruistic in their allocation, but struggle with the Samaritan’s dilemma. Non-DAC donors, on 
the other hand, appear to be driven by political motivations, giving more aid to less democratic 
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countries that are more similar to them in form of government. This result suggest that non-
DAC donors are more driven by self-interest than DAC donors.  
Another possible explanation for why DAC donors are not selective in their allocation, as they 
claim to be, is that competition from non-DAC donors threaten their conditionality. If this was 
the case, DAC and non-DAC donors would compete to give aid to the same countries, leading 
to similar aid allocation between these donor groups (Barthel et al., 2014). However, this is not 
what the results show. Even though neither group consider corruption in their allocation, they 
behave quite differently with regards to other considerations. Therefore, it does not seem like 
they give aid to the same countries due to competition. Could it still be that DAC donors are 
less selective and look though their fingers on their own conditionality rules in order to reach 
out to more countries and be competitive in the aid market? When considering aid allocation 
patterns over time, this does not seem to be the case. In the 90s when the competition with non-
DAC donors over aid was low, DAC donors actually gave more aid to more corrupt countries, 
and did not consider recipients’ needs. This indicates that the behaviour of DAC donors do not 
seem to be negatively affected by that of non-DAC donors.  
When investigating the allocation of donors individually, it becomes apparent that the 
separation between DAC and non-DAC donors is not as clear cut as anticipated. Donors allocate 
aid quite heterogeneously, even within more specific groups of donors that would be expected 
to behave similarly. This heterogeneity has been found in previous literature as well (Alesina 
& Weder, 2002; Berthélemy, 2006; Brück & Xu, 2012; Dreher et al., 2011), but is surprising 
for DAC donors as organised donors should behave similarly (Svensson, 2000). This is yet 
another sign that not all DAC donors follow the allocation rules they have set for themselves. 
Non-DAC donors are just as heterogenous in their allocation, making it clear that they should 
not all be tarred with the same brush. The criticism towards non-DAC donors is not fully 
confirmed or rejected, in accordance with (Dreher et al., 2011). Within the group of non-DAC 
donors, there are donors who reward good institutions and that undermines them, as well as not 
considering them in their allocation. This is also the case for DAC donors. For instance, the 
U.S. and China do not behave so differently with regards to allocating more aid to more corrupt 
countries.  
Different donors seem to give aid on different grounds, independently of the aid regimes they 
claim to adhere to. Differences in aid allocation appears to be explainable by differences in aid 
motivations. Nordic donors are very sensitive to the needs of recipients, at the expense of not 
being selective in corruption. Some of them also value democracy. Donors that are members of 
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EU but not DAC appear to have chosen differently in this trade-off, choosing to reward less 
corrupt countries but not giving aid to those in most need. It is possible that these countries 
want to prove themselves to DAC by being selective based on corruption, because they are 
observers and want to gain membership (OECD, 2019). However, this result completely 
contradicts the result of Dreher et al. (2011), who find that these donors give more aid to more 
corrupt recipients in need. It is possible that my results for this specific donor group are biased 
due to few observations. Regardless, there is evidence of a trade-off between recipients’ needs 
and rewarding less corrupt countries. Portugal is the only donor in my findings that manages to 
balance these considerations. Their aid allocation does not appear to be driven by political or 
economic self-interest to a large extent. It is therefore possible that truly altruistic donors have 
an advantage in overcoming this trade-off, because they are not affected by other priorities. 
Among the donors that give more aid to more corrupt countries, the U.S and Spain seem to be 
concerned with political interests in the form of democracy and colonial history, while China 
appears to have economic interests. The result for the United States is similar to that in Alesina 
and Weder (2002). Based on these findings, it appears that the self-interests of donors hinders 
considerations of good institutions and need. It is possible that both these priorities could be 
catered to if donors are not self-interested, but this is hard to say as the majority of donors do 
not seem to be purely altruistic based on my estimations.  
The difference in my results compared to those of Alesina and Weder (2002) seems to be largely 
explainable by donor heterogeneity and the inclusion of non-DAC donors in the data. However, 
this does not explain why I do not find that Nordic donors reward less corrupt countries. Since 
the largest difference between my analysis and that of Alesina and Weder (2002) is the time 
period assessed, it appears that the aid allocation of Nordic donors have changed to become less 
selective. This fits well with Easterly and Williamson (2011), who find that donors give aid to 
the same countries over time, and that these countries have become more corrupt. They actually 
find that Nordic donors perform poorly on the selectivity criteria in 1996-2002, although this is 
partly explained by them including democracy as an indicator of selectivity. It is also possible 
that different donors are affected differently by competition with new donors, so that DAC 
donors collectively do not change their behaviour, while for example Nordic donors lowers 
their selectivity in order to remain competitive. Since larger donors are more affected by 
competition than smaller donors (Annen & Moers, 2017), the recline in selectivity of Nordic 
donors could be because aid from these donors has increased since the study of Alesina and 
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Weder (2002)9. Spain also appear to have worsened in their corruption selectivity, going from 
insignificantly negative in Alesina and Weder (2002) to significant in my results.  
If most donors are self-interested and do not follow their own allocation rules, why do they 
bother to set them? One possibility is of course that they are truly trying to improve, but that 
change is complicated and takes time. Another option is that DAC donors are concerned for 
their own reputation, and therefore uses conditionality as a form of window dressing in order 
to justify their selfish aid regimes. It could also be that there is a free-riding problem in 
conditionality. When there are many donors, conditionality becomes a public good. The donor 
community collectively would benefit from selective allocation, but each donor benefit more 
from selfish allocation (Bourguignon & Platteau, 2015). Therefore, it is possible that DAC 
donors set these allocation rules in the hopes that other donors will follow them, while they 
themselves are free-riders on the rise in institutional quality this leads to. It is hard to say for 
certain what leads donors to set allocation rules they do not follow, and it is not in the scope of 
this master’s thesis. However, further research should be devoted to this area.  
The incentive problem when there are many donors can be solved with aid coordination, 
according to Gibson et al. (2005). They claim that when OECD ratified the Anti-Corruption 
Convention in 1999, they changed the rules of the aid game by excluding the scenario of a 
corrupt recipient playing two donors against each other. However, not all aid donors are 
members of OECD. This creates the possibility of recipient countries playing DAC donors 
against non-DAC donors, possibly forcing DAC donors to give aid without conditions.  
Aid may be more effective when it is donated by a single or dominant donor, Knack and 
Rahman (2007) claim. They credit some of the success of the Marshall Plan to this fact. In order 
to increase responsibility for aid results in donors, they suggest appointing a lead donor, who 
will be incentivised to work towards development goals because their reputation as a donor 
depends on the development results in the recipient country. However, this could increase 
incentive problems as donors then would compete to be the lead donor, putting them in a weak 
position in negotiations. Another option is for donors to specialise within different sectors in 
the recipient country. That way, one donor would be responsible for aid results in the health 
sector, while another would have to prove their aid is beneficial for infrastructure. A possible 
issue with this solution is that donors could face accusations of neglecting sectors or recipients 
in need by focusing their aid in this way.  
 
9 See Figure 4 in Appendix D for the evolution of aid from Nordic donors from 1995-2013.  
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The solution with the least distorting effects may be that recipient countries take charge of their 
own development process and attempt to limit the problem with competitive aid practices 
(Knack & Rahman, 2007). This could be done by allowing fewer donors in the recipient 
country, or refusing some of the aid. This would only effectively reduce incentive problems if 
the recipient country can contractually commit to the donors so that they cannot be easily 
replaced. This solution might be difficult to achieve in reality, as incentive problems in the 
recipient country often prevents such policies from being implemented. The long-run costs of 
poor institutions and ineffective aid is often outweighed by the short-run benefits of corruption 
for political leaders. This is both a collective good problem and an intertemporal problem. | 
9.  Conclusion  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether corruption and recipients’ needs are considered 
in aid allocation, and if the extent to which it is differs between donors who set clear conditions 
for their aid and donors who do not. The analysis is split in two parts because the research 
question is twofold. In the first part, an OLS estimation is applied to all donors. I find that 
corrupt donors receive more aid, and that recipients’ needs are not taken into account. Instead, 
donors appear to be self-interested, motivated by political interests and reputational factors. In 
part two of the analysis, OLS and PPML estimation models are all applied to DAC and non-
DAC donors separately, in order to identify differences and similarities. The results show that 
neither consider corruption in their allocation, but DAC donors consider recipients’ needs, 
while non-DAC donors are more concerned with political self-interest. However, I find large 
heterogeneity in aid allocation within these groups, and even within previously assumed similar 
sub-groups. Most donors do not consider corruption in their allocation, notable exceptions being 
the DAC donor the U.S. and the non-DAC donor China, who both give more aid to more corrupt 
countries. My results do not fully reject or confirm the criticism towards non-DAC donors, but 
shows that they should not be tarred with the same brush.  
The heterogenous allocation appears to be explainable by differences in donors’ motivations. 
Some donors are sensitive to the needs of recipients. I find here indications of a trade-off 
between selectivity in corruption and income, as only one donor is successful in catering to both 
priorities. Other donors are more concerned with political and economic interest, and this 
appears to not be compatible with rewarding less corrupt countries. I do not find evidence that 
competition leads donors to allocate similarly, and therefore it does not seem like non-DAC 
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donors undermine the efforts of DAC donors. Moreover, there does not appear to be much 
conditionality and selectivity to be undermined.  
A few questions rises from the findings in this thesis. Previous literature has shown that donors 
appear to be rigid over time in what countries they give aid to, and that this could explain why 
previously selective donors are not as selective anymore (Easterly & Williamson, 2011). 
Further research should therefore be directed towards donors’ sensitivity to institutional 
changes over time. While this thesis attempts to explain why donors do not practice selectivity 
even though they claim to do so, it does not explain why they set rules for themselves that they 
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Appendix A: Time Effects for All Donors 
 
  
Table 13: Aid Allocation for All Donors: Different Time Periods 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
       1995-1999    2000-2004    2005-2009    2010-2013 
 Log Income 0.540** -0.559** -0.159 0.218 
   (0.228) (0.264) (0.179) (0.150) 
 Log Population -0.591*** -0.664*** -0.635*** -0.543*** 
   (0.087) (0.135) (0.087) (0.088) 
 Openness -0.003 0.005 0.002 0.000 
   (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
 Democracy -0.020 0.132 0.148* 0.039 
   (0.074) (0.110) (0.085) (0.084) 
 Long Colony 0.268 0.326 0.745* 0.303 
   (0.712) (0.572) (0.436) (0.482) 
 Short Colony -1.704*** 0.026 -0.226 -0.334 
   (0.487) (0.470) (0.360) (0.389) 
 Israel 1.417** -1.919 -3.752**  
   (0.709) (1.936) (1.555)  
 CPI-score -0.033** -0.045** -0.056*** -0.010 
   (0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) 
 Egypt  1.255 0.115 0.232 
    (1.891) (1.525) (1.449) 
 Constant 12.749*** 20.157*** 17.455*** 14.173*** 
   (2.025) (2.255) (1.579) (1.435) 
 Obs. 74 113 136 125 
 R-squared  0.424 0.462 0.573 0.342 
Time dummies no no no no 
 
Note: The table reports ordinary least squares estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per capita in 5-
year periods. Column (1) displays the years 1995-1999,  column (2)  displays the years 2000-2004, column (3) displays 
the years 2005-2009, and column (4) displays the years 2010-2013. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** 













Appendix B: Robustness Checks for Donor Groups 
 
Table 14: Aid Allocation for DAC and Non-DAC Donors: Full Time Period 
                                                             OLS                                        PPML 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
       DAC    non-DAC    DAC    non-DAC 
 CPI-score -0.007 -0.014 -0.000 -0.001 
   (0.006) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) 
 Log Income -0.476*** -0.052 -0.029*** -0.006 
   (0.077) (0.223) (0.004) (0.015) 
 Log Population -0.376*** -0.696*** -0.023*** -0.048*** 
   (0.042) (0.124) (0.003) (0.008) 
 Openness 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 
   (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Democracy -0.045 0.490*** -0.002 0.034*** 
   (0.038) (0.109) (0.003) (0.007) 
 Long Colony 0.393* 1.455** 0.027* 0.111** 
   (0.217) (0.575) (0.016) (0.056) 
 Short Colony 0.085 -1.711*** 0.006 -0.120*** 
   (0.170) (0.466) (0.012) (0.038) 
 Constant 21.452*** 13.999*** 3.098*** 2.642*** 
   (0.710) (1.985) (0.043) (0.133) 
 Obs. 412 352 409 350 
 R-squared  0.294 0.245 0.290 0.241 
Note: The table reports estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per capita in 
5-year periods from 1995 to 2013. Column (1) and (2) are estimated with ordinary least 
squares. Column (3) and (4) are estimated with pseudo piosson maximum likelihood. 
Column (1) and (3) display results for DAC donors, while column (2) and (4) display results 
for non-DAC donors. The dummy for Israel is not included as it is not relevant for all 
donors. Standard errors are in parentheses (Robust for PPML) *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
Table 15: Robustness Check of Measurement Error for Donor Groups 
                                   Control of Corruption          Voice and Accountability                      FDI                       Oil and Mineral 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
       DAC    non-
DAC 
   DAC    Non-
DAC 
   DAC    non-
DAC 
   DAC    non-
DAC 
 Control of  0.001 -0.005       
  Corruption (0.010) (0.035)       
         
 Log Income -0.034*** -0.040* -0.031*** -0.025 -0.031*** -0.024 -0.028*** -0.037 
   (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.022) (0.008) (0.025) (0.007) (0.024) 
 Log Population -0.023*** -0.048*** -0.024*** -0.050*** -0.028*** -0.039*** -0.025*** -0.048*** 
   (0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.012) 
 Openness 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001   -0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.001) 
 Political Rights -0.002 0.040***   -0.004 0.048*** -0.002 0.033*** 
   (0.004) (0.011)   (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) 
 Long Colony 0.029 0.093 0.026 0.083 0.030 0.144* 0.027 0.069 
   (0.020) (0.070) (0.021) (0.068) (0.023) (0.074) (0.020) (0.069) 
 Short Colony -0.008 -0.105** -0.009 -0.110** -0.017 -0.141*** -0.007 -0.102** 
   (0.016) (0.046) (0.016) (0.046) (0.017) (0.047) (0.015) (0.048) 
 CPI-score   -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 Voice and   0.015 -0.108***     
  Accountability   (0.011) (0.025)     
58 
 
         
 FDI     0.000 0.000*   
       (0.000) (0.000)   
 Oil       -0.000 0.002* 
         (0.001) (0.001) 
 Mineral       0.002** 0.014*** 
         (0.001) (0.004) 
 Constant 3.115*** 2.807*** 3.118*** 2.834*** 3.145*** 2.693*** 3.108*** 2.855*** 
   (0.061) (0.200) (0.058) (0.185) (0.076) (0.223) (0.066) (0.201) 
 Obs. 270 222 271 222 221 181 285 224 
 R-squared  0.276 0.277 0.282 0.290 0.257 0.338 0.281 0.316 
 
Note: The table reports pseudo poisson maximum likelihood estimates of the impact of Corruption on the log of aid 
per capita in 5-year periods. Column (1) and (2) displays the results where Control of Corruption is the independent 
variable for DAC and non-DAC donors respectively. Column (3) and (4) displays results where Voice and 
Accountability measures democracy, and in column (5) and (6) FDI measures economic openness. In column (7) and 

























Appendix C: Results from Other Estimation Approaches  
 
Table 16: Aid Allocation of Donor groups (OLS) 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
       Nordic    Other 
DAC 
   Middle 
East 
   non-DAC 
EU 
   Other 
non-DAC 
 CPI-score 0.001 -0.011 0.037 0.025** -0.017 
   (0.013) (0.008) (0.027) (0.011) (0.025) 
 Log Income -1.355*** -0.403*** 0.845** 0.037 -0.302 
   (0.160) (0.105) (0.316) (0.154) (0.312) 
 Log Population -0.362*** -0.414*** -0.553*** -0.816*** -0.627*** 
   (0.086) (0.054) (0.162) (0.099) (0.164) 
 Openness 0.008* -0.000 -0.004 0.003 0.008 
   (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) 
 Democracy -0.144* -0.043 -0.066 0.203*** 0.264* 
   (0.074) (0.047) (0.140) (0.076) (0.141) 
 Long Colony 0.208 0.434 0.537 -0.121 0.383 
   (0.438) (0.273) (0.782) (0.317) (0.857) 
 Short Colony 0.295 -0.094 -0.241 0.264 -0.992 
   (0.336) (0.212) (0.661) (0.259) (0.638) 
 Constant 25.047*** 21.009*** 6.951*** 7.710*** 17.104*** 
   (1.427) (0.937) (2.412) (1.379) (2.757) 
 Obs. 263 295 58 120 197 
 R-squared  0.320 0.274 0.532 0.577 0.158 
 
Note: The table reports ordinary least squares estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per capita in 5-
year periods. Column (1) displays results for Nordic donors, column (2) displays results for other DAC donors, 
column (3) displays results for Middle East and OPEC donors, column (4) displays results for non-DAC donors that 
are members of EU, and column (5) displays results for other non-DAC donors. Standard errors are in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
Table 17: Aid Allocation of DAC and non-DAC Donors (Tobit) 
PANEL A       
    (1)     (2)  
     DAC      Non-DAC  
 CPI-score  -.003   -.011  
    (.002)   (.007)  
  Log Income  -.113***   .054  
    (.037)   (.119)  
 Log Population  -.966***   -.79***  
    (.023)   (.074)  
 Openness  0   .001  
    (.001)   (.002)  
 Democracy  .021   .058  
    (.015)   (.05)  
 Long Colony  -.018   .506  
    (.112)   (.415)  
 Short Colony  .067   -.086  
    (.058)   (.203)  
 Constant  3.938***   1.084  
    (.318)   (1.063)  
 Observations  320   320  
 R-squared  .892   .337  
PANEL B      
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
60 
 
       Nordic    Other 
DAC 
   Middle East    Non-DAC 
EU 
   Other Non-
DAC 
 CPI-score -0.020*** -0.003 0.001 -0.017 -0.018** 
   (0.006) (0.002) (0.026) (0.012) (0.008) 
 Log Income -0.141 -0.112*** -0.395 0.292 0.042 
   (0.091) (0.037) (0.420) (0.208) (0.132) 
 Log Population -0.730*** -0.966*** -1.329*** -0.400*** -0.800*** 
   (0.060) (0.023) (0.320) (0.111) (0.084) 
 Openness -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.007* 0.003 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) 
 Democracy -0.068* 0.021 0.574*** 0.033 0.060 
   (0.039) (0.015) (0.219) (0.085) (0.056) 
 Long Colony -0.063 -0.017 -0.098 5.269 0.786 
   (0.278) (0.112) (1.318) (431.725) (0.548) 
 Short Colony 0.053 0.067 -0.576 0.491 -0.141 
   (0.153) (0.058) (0.874) (0.309) (0.232) 
 Constant 4.349*** 3.928*** 1.051 -7.831 0.908 













 Pseudo R2  0.409 0.893 0.261 0.233 0.316 
Note: The table reports ordinary least squares estimates of the impact of CPI-score on the log of aid per capita in 5-
year periods. Panel A displays results for DAC donors in column (1) and non-DAC donors in column (2). Panel B 
displays results for Nordic donors in column (1), other DAC donors in column (2), Middle East and OPEC donors 
in column (3), non-DAC donors that are members of EU in column (4) and other non-DAC donors in column (5). 



















Appendix D: Additional Tests and Descriptives  
 
Table 18: Matrix of Correlations 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12) 
 (1) CPI-score 1.000 
 (2) Control of Corruption 0.148 1.000 
 (3) Income 0.450 0.089 1.000 
 (4) Population -0.001 -0.159 -0.036 1.000 
 (5) Openness 0.068 0.006 0.020 -0.060 1.000 
 (6) FDI 0.009 -0.017 -0.050 -0.036 -0.050 1.000 
 (7) Political Rights -0.483 0.098 -0.178 0.054 -0.064 -0.038 1.000 
 (8) Voice and Accountability 0.370 0.157 0.310 0.124 0.033 -0.028 -0.241 1.000 
 (9) Long Colony -0.044 0.080 -0.136 -0.275 0.089 0.006 -0.139 0.021 1.000 
 (10) Short Colony 0.080 0.107 0.140 -0.085 0.064 -0.028 -0.045 0.123 -0.189 1.000 
 (11) Mineral 0.091 0.006 -0.028 -0.048 0.093 0.001 -0.080 0.084 0.106 -0.135 1.000 
 (12) Oil -0.239 0.147 0.238 -0.043 0.063 -0.117 0.354 0.017 -0.005 0.084 -0.109 1.000 
 
 
Figure 4: Aid from Nordic Donors 1995-2013 
 
